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A dramatic composition is capable of two distinct public uses. It 
may be printed as a book and represented as a drama. . . . The 
exclusive right of multiplying copies is called copyright. But this 
does not embrace the right of representation. . . . The sole liberty 
of publicly performing a dramatic composition might more 
properly be called dramatic right or acting right. . . . I have adopted 
playright as being, in my judgment, the best name for the purpose. 
It is a convenient euphonious word, and its formation is analogous 
to that of copyright. As the latter word literally means the right to 
copy a work, or the right to the copy, so playright means the right 
to play a drama, or the right to the play. 
 —Eaton Sylvester Drone1 
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 1. EATON S. DRONE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 553 (1879). Copyright in both 
Britain and the United States was initially limited to the right to print and sell copies. The 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
American copyright law nominally vests exclusive rights in “authors.”2 
“Authors” in America, as often as not, are the employers of the individuals 
who actually create copyrightable works.3 Even when the law vests copyright 
in creators, the architecture of the system encourages them to assign their 
copyrights to intermediaries, who are motivated by potential profits to 
disseminate the works to the public.4 Employers and assignees stand in the 
authors’ shoes and may control a work’s exploitation to the exclusion of the 
individuals who created it.5 That’s the essence of a copyright system that is 
fundamentally utilitarian in its design. With the narrow exceptions of painters 
and sculptors, American authors have no enforceable attribution or integrity 
rights.6 The originality standard for “meriting” copyright protection is low, 
and follow-on creators who add even a little creativity to authorized 
adaptations of copyrighted works are entitled to exclusive rights in their 
versions of those works. This is the American version of copyright law in a 
nutshell.7 
In stark contrast to that model, consider the American playwright: the 
playwright keeps her copyright, rather than assigning it. In the United States, 
playwrights license public exploitation, and pay the intermediary exploiters 
with a share of the proceeds rather than ownership of the copyright.8 
Playwrights assert strong, apparently enforceable rights to attribution and 
integrity.9 Playwrights, finally, insist that other creators who contribute 
 
British Parliament and United States Congress later expanded copyright to encompass other 
rights. See infra notes 106–18, 134–38, 213–15, 261 and accompanying text. 
 2. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 3. See U.S. Copyright Office, Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act, Circular 
9 (revised Apr. 2010). 
 4. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on 
file with author). 
 5. See, e.g., Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Larue, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,814 (10th 
Cir. 1998); Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 930 (2d Cir. 1914). 
 6. See ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 23–35 (2009). 
 7. See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 296–304, 383–404 (4th ed. 
2007). 
 8. See, e.g., DONALD C. FARBER, PRODUCING THEATRE 1–33 (3d rev. ed. 2006). 
 9. See, e.g., DONALD C. FARBER, FROM OPTION TO OPENING: A GUIDE TO 
PRODUCING PLAYS OFF BROADWAY 21 (5th ed. rev. 2005); Samuel G. Freedman, Who’s to 
Say Whether a Playwright is Wronged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1984, at E6; United Press Int’l, Albee 
Seeking to Close All-Male “Woolf,” N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1984, at C5; Dramatists Guild of Am., 
Dramatists Bill of Rights, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/billofrights/ (last visited Aug. 3, 
2010); Dramatists Play Service, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 
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significant creative expression to licensed productions of their scripts have 
added no authorship and should receive no copyright protection for their 
additions.10  
What accounts for the differences? There’s no obvious language in the 
copyright statute suggesting that dramatists or their plays be treated as unique 
legal beasts. The current copyright statute includes several relatively minor 
provisions that single dramatic works out for more favorable treatment in 
particular narrow contexts.11 In general, the category of dramatic works 
(which Congress doesn’t even bother to define) is treated the same way as 
other subject matter categories. Federal copyright cases involving dramatic 
works are surprisingly scant. 
For most of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, the contours of federal 
statutory copyright and the formal prerequisites for perfecting it fit dramatic 
works poorly. Until 1978, American copyright law focused chiefly on works 
that had been published—for most works, publication was the quid pro quo 
 
http://www.dramatists.com/faqsmanager/applications/faqsmanager/ (last visited Aug. 3, 
2010). 
 10. See, e.g., John Weidman, Protecting the American Playwright: The Seventh Annual Media 
and Society Lecture, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 639, 641–42 (2007); Ralph Sevush, The Urinetown 
Papers: The U.S. Copyright Office Debunks the Notion of a “Directors Copyright,” THE DRAMATIST, 
Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 30; Dramatists Guild of Am., Dramatists’ Copyright & Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 2000, http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about_statements_copyright.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2010); see also Thomson v. Larsen, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
dramaturg was not a joint author of musical because composer/dramatist did not intend to 
share authorship credit); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
actors were not joint authors of three plays because their contributions were not 
independently copyrightable); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding 
actress not a joint author of one-woman play because dramatist did not intend to share 
authorship credit). But see, e.g., Carrie Ryan Gallia, Note, To Fix or Not to Fix, Copyright’s 
Fixation Requirement and the Rights of Theatrical Collaborators, 92 MINN. L. REV. 231, 264 (2007) 
(“By transforming a stack of pages into a live performance, a director demonstrates 
sufficient originality.”); Margit Livingston, Inspiration or Imitation? Copyright Protection for Stage 
Directions, 50 B.C. L. REV. 427, 486 (2009) (“[A] straightforward application of traditional 
copyright law would dictate that stage directions are subject to copyright protection.”). 
 11. Section 110 expressly limits some of its exemptions for noncommercial 
performances or displays to “non-dramatic literary or musical works,” excluding dramatic 
works, choreographic works, pictorial graphic and sculptural works, motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works and architectural works. Section 118 limits the scope of the statutory 
noncommercial broadcasting license to “published nondramatic musical works and 
published pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.” Section 121 limits the scope of the 
exemption for reproduction and distribution of copies or phonorecords in formats 
accessible for people with disabilities to “previously published, non-dramatic literary work.” 
Those distinctions, though, don’t begin to explain the more fundamental differences in 
copyright ownership and control described in the text accompanying notes 8–10. 
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for statutory copyright protection.12 The vast majority of plays, even those 
that were exploited commercially, were never published as U.S. copyright law 
defined it.13 Playwrights in America until 1909 faced a choice of arranging to 
publish their scripts to secure federal statutory protection or relying on 
whatever copyright protection state courts might afford unpublished works.14 
That dilemma persuaded Congress in 1909 to permit copyright registration 
for unpublished plays.15 While thousands of unpublished play scripts were 
registered,16 very few of them became involved in federal litigation.17 
Important questions about how the copyright statute applied to works 
registered as unpublished, such as the duration of rights for unpublished 
works,18 remained unresolved for years.19  
Instead of relying on federal statutory copyright, lawyers for dramatists 
claimed that their clients’ work was better protected under state “common 
law copyright.”20 The 1909 Copyright Act expressly preserved “the right of 
the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in 
 
 12. L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–12, 33–
34 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 705–06. 
 13. See, e.g., BARRETT H. CLARK, 1 AMERICA’S LOST PLAYS v–vi (1940). 
 14. See Revision of the Copyright Laws: Hearings on Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the 
Acts Respecting Copyright Before the House and Senate Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong. 21–41 (1908) 
(testimony of witnesses representing the American Dramatists Club and the National 
Association of Theatrical Managers); 1 LIBRARY OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DRAMATIC 
COMPOSITIONS COPYRIGHTED IN THE UNITED STATES 1870 TO 1916, at 1 (1918). 
 15. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 11, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (later § 12). 
 16. See LIBRARY OF CONG., FIFTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1951, at 2 (1952); LIBRARY OF 
CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1924–25, at 196–
97 (1925); LIBRARY OF CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR 1918–19, at 138–39 (1919). 
 17. See, e.g., Rosen v. Loew’s, Inc., 162 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding the authors of 
“The Mortal Storm” did not copy “The Mad Dog of Europe”); Marx v. United States, 96 
F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938) (affirming criminal conviction for infringement of radio script); 
Davis v. E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding play 
based on novel “Ethan Frome” to be infringed by TV movie). 
 18. See Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding that twenty-eight 
year duration for published works should also apply to registered unpublished work, but the 
date of deposit should be deemed the date of publication). 
 19. William S. Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957), in 1 COPYRIGHT SOCIETY 
OF THE USA, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 190, 196 (1963). 
 20. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 312 (Comm. Print 
1963) (letter from Irwin Karp, May 29, 1961); PHILIP WITTENBERG, THE PROTECTION AND 
MARKETING OF LITERARY PROPERTY 11–14 (1937); Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright 
Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 473–79 (1955). 
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equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work 
without his consent . . . .”21 A 1957 Copyright Office study of state common 
law copyright described it as giving authors “absolute rights in an 
unpublished work”22 that were “not subject to the limitations imposed by the 
statute upon copyright.”23 The rights “continue perpetually as long as the 
work remains unpublished, unless . . . the owner voluntarily chooses to 
secure statutory copyright by registration in the Copyright Office.”24 The 
scope of the playwrights’ common law right was perceived to be broader 
than the common law copyright at issue in Wheaton v. Peters,25 encompassing 
what we would today identify as adaptation and public performance rights as 
well as reproduction and distribution rights. In 1879, treatise author Eaton 
Drone dubbed the common law public performance right in unpublished 
dramatic works “playright,”26 and, at least for a time, the usage enjoyed 
favor.27 
This Article explores playwrights’ common law “play right.” Since this 
conference celebrates the 300th birthday of the Statute of Anne, I begin in 
England in the 17th Century. I find no trace of a common law playwright’s 
performance right in either the law or the customary practices surrounding 
17th and 18th century English theatre. I argue that the nature and degree of 
royal supervision of theatre companies and performance during the period 
presented no occasion (and, indeed, left no opportunity) for such a right to 
arise. I discuss the impetus for Parliament’s enactment of a performance 
 
 21. Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075. 
 22. Strauss, supra note 19, at 191 (citing DRONE, supra note 1, at 8). 
 23. Id. at 194. 
 24. Id. at 191; see George A. Warp, The Position of the Dramatist in Copyright Law, 22 B.U. 
L. REV. 528, 529–30 (1942). 
 25. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); see L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968). See generally Craig Joyce, The Story of Wheaton v. Peters: A 
Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2006). 
 26. DRONE, supra note 1, at 553. Drone used the single word “playright” because of its 
parallel to “copyright” and the courts following Drone did so as well. In this essay, I use 
“play right” unless I am quoting to minimize confusion. 
 27. See, e.g., Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Hand, J.) (“I think that 
play right and copyright are quite distinct under the statute, in spite of the fact that printed 
publication will forfeit both, and that one statutory copyright will protect both.”); R.R. 
BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 162 (1912) (“[T]he new American code 
provides not only for copyright, but for playright or right of performance.”); WILLIAM 
MORRIS COLLES & HAROLD HARDY, PLAYRIGHT AND COPYRIGHT IN ALL COUNTRIES 1 
(1906) (“The playright is more valuable, as a rule, than the copyright in a play. . . .”); Charles 
Collins, Playright and the Common Law, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 381 (1925) (“Playright is a word 
coined by Mr. Drone . . . . It has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States 
and is accordingly preferred. . . .” (citation omitted)); Warp, supra note 24, at 546 (“[T]he 
term ‘playright’ refers to the exclusive right to present dramatic works.”).  
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right statute in 1833, and its decision, nine years later, to adopt a law that 
scuttled any nascent tendencies supporting the development of a common 
law performance right by equating public performance with publication for 
the purposes of copyright.  
I then cross the Atlantic to the United States, and note that the colonies 
and the young nation imported their actors, managers, plays, and customary 
theatrical practices from England. I again find no trace of a common law play 
right before 1856. That year was the year that Congress followed the British 
example and enacted a statutory public performance right for the authors and 
proprietors of dramatic compositions.28 The first common law performance 
right cases show up shortly thereafter, as courts sought to respond to formal 
defects in the copyrights of claimants seeking to enforce their rights under 
the new statute.29  
In 1879, Eaton Drone relied on an expansive natural rights theory about 
the true nature of copyright to draw from these cases a generous depiction of 
play right as a perpetual entitlement without exceptions.30 Courts adopted 
Drone’s version of common law play right and followed it for the next thirty 
years.31 The availability of a strong natural right claim, however, made little 
difference to actual playwrights, who were deemed to have assigned their 
rights to the producers of their plays.  
The strong copyright-like rights that playwrights enjoy today are chiefly 
contractual, secured for them in 1926 by the collective action of members of 
the Dramatists’ Guild, who claimed to be a labor union and thus entitled to 
an antitrust exemption.32 Courts would later rule that the exemption was not 
available to the Guild,33 but its members and the theatre producers it 
contracts with continued to behave, most of the time, as if they were bound 
by Guild contracts. Meanwhile, the broad Drone view of natural rights 
copyright fell out of fashion, to be replaced, first, by a utilitarian public-
interest account34 and later by a utilitarian broad property rights account.35 
 
 28. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138. 
 29. E.g., Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861). 
 30. DRONE, supra note 1, at 553–600; see infra notes 173–89 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., Frohman v. Ferris, 87 N.E. 327 (Ill. 1909), aff’d, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); 
Tomkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882). 
 32. See An Arbiter to Keep Peace in Theatre, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1926, at 24; infra notes 
238–45 and accompanying text. 
 33. Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945); see text accompanying infra notes 252–
60. 
 34. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982) (“The 
ultimate goal is not author remuneration, however, but the advancement and dissemination 
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The evolution of attitudes about the nature of copyright made no appreciable 
change in playwrights’ lives or livelihoods.  
II. PLAY RIGHT IN ENGLAND 
Since our conference is celebrating the 300th birthday of the Statute of 
Anne, we should begin by examining the common law literary property rights 
that playwrights enjoyed in the century preceding the enactment of the 
Statute of Anne. If playwrights’ “play right” derives from common law 
sources, one might expect to be able to find the sources of a common law 
play right in the case law of the 17th and early 18th century. The examination 
need not keep us for long, because it seems evident from all sources that 
playwrights enjoyed no literary property rights in their scripts. Playwrights’ 
common law rights are apparently of more recent origin. 
First, some common ground: the notion that common law copyright 
predated statutory copyright in England was first advanced by members of 
the stationers’ guild, after the enactment of the Statute of Anne, to press 
claims for perpetual printing monopolies.36 The evidence they offered to 
support their theory of perpetual common law copyright was longstanding 
“stationers’ copyright,” a naked horizontal restraint of trade under which 
members of the Worshipful Company of Stationers agreed not to reprint any 
text first claimed by another member.37 Stationers treated members’ 
assertions of exclusive rights to a text as perpetual, permitting them to be 
sold to or inherited by other members of the Guild.38 Since stationers 
commonly (although not invariably) paid the owner of a manuscript 
something in return for the privilege of printing it, they claimed that they 
 
of culture and knowledge.”). See generally Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1215–16 (1998) (remarking trend). 
 35. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996). See generally Neil Netanel, Why 
Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 
(Fiona MacMillan ed., 2007) (criticizing trend); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright As 
Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW (forthcoming 2010) 
(arguing that research in psychology and behavioral economics cast doubt on incentive 
theory of copyright). 
 36. E.g., Howard Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the 
Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1129–47 (1983). See generally RONAN 
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 191–210 (2004). 
 37.  See JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY 
OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 15–36 (1994); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning 
Literary Property, 7 MICH. L. REV. 100, 105–09 (2008). 
 38. See Don-JOHN DUGAS, MARKETING THE BARD: SHAKESPEARE IN PERFORMANCE 
AND PRINT 1660–1740, 93–94 (2006); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE 
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 12 (1993). 
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must by their payment have purchased a perpetual common law literary 
property right.39 Stationers argued unsuccessfully in court that this perpetual 
common law right survived the enactment of the Statute of Anne.40 
Copyright historians have examined the evidence supporting the 
existence of a common law literary property right in 17th century England 
and persuasively debunked it.41 To the extent that common law literary 
property rights may be said to have existed in some place and at some time, 
they did not precede the enactment of the Statute of Anne. For most 
purposes, the inquiry is of only academic interest, because the British courts 
ultimately held that even if there had been such a common law right, the 
enactment of the Statute of Anne had abrogated it for all published works.42 
Such a right, had it existed, might have offered protection to unpublished 
scripts, but the British Parliament eventually decided that a play’s first public 
performance should be equated with publication for copyright purposes.43 
 
 39. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 47–78; Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and 
Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 323–38 (2003). Paying 
the owner of a manuscript was not, of course, the same as paying the author. See, e.g., LEO 
KIRSCHBAUM, SHAKESPEARE AND THE STATIONERS 5–7 (1955). 
 40. See PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 172–80; ROSE, supra note 38, at 67–91. 
 41. See, e.g., DEAZLEY, supra note 36, at 73–74, 195–210; RONAN DEAZLEY, 
RETHINKING COPYRIGHT 63–65 (2006); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 1:11 (2009); ROSE, supra note 38, at 22 (“[T]here is no evidence that copyright was ever 
recognized as a common law right of an author in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.”); 
Abrams, supra note 36, at 1134 (“As a matter of historical fact, the common law never 
developed any law of copyright.”). But see H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The Untold Story of the 
First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1249 (2010) 
(suggesting that complaints filed in Chancery before 1710 to vindicate stationer’s copyright 
claims may provide some evidence of common law copyright). 
 42. Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 845 (1774); see DEAZLEY, supra note 36, at 
191–220. 
 43. 1842 Copyright Law Amendment Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, § XX. The 1842 Copyright 
Law Amendment includes the first post-mortem copyright term, the first express work-
made-for-hire provision, and the first compulsory license for reprinting out-of-print books. 
See generally Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Copyright Amendment Act 1842, PRIMARY 
SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22uk_1842%22. Section 20 of the Act extended the 
dramatic performance right initially enacted in 1833 to musical compositions, and provided 
that “the first public Representation or Performance of any Dramatic Piece or Musical 
Composition shall be deemed equivalent, in the Construction of this Act, to the first 
Publication of any Book.” The 1842 Act also permitted the registration of unpublished but 
publicly performed dramas and musical compositions, without depositing any copies, 
through recording the title, the name and place of abode of the author or composer, the 
name and place of abode of the copyright proprietor, and the time and place of the first 
public performance. 1842 Copyright Law Amendment Act, § XX. The Act also provided 
 
1381-1426 LITMAN 103010 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2010  11:41 AM 
2010] THE INVENTION OF COMMON LAW PLAY RIGHT 1389 
More fundamentally, however, proponents of common law copyright 
conceived of it as a printing right, limited to control over the printing and 
sale of copies. In the 18th century, not even the most ardent defender of 
common law copyright suggested it extended to control over public 
performances of works.44 Thus, a playwright’s common law rights in a script, 
had they existed, would have empowered the dramatist to sell that script to a 
printer for publication, or withhold it from publication. It would have given 
the playwright no recourse, however, if players chose to perform the 
unpublished script without a license. 
A. ENGLISH THEATRE BEFORE THE STATUTE OF ANNE 
We tend to view historical facts through a contemporary lens. When we 
see a practice that looks familiar, we assume that its context must have 
matched, or at least resembled, its contemporary analog. Thus, much 
speculation about common law play right seems to begin by recognizing 
landmarks that would characterize such a right in recent times, and assuming 
the context must have followed familiar patterns. A serious exploration of 
the English theatre before the enactment of the Statute of Anne, though, 
reveals a context starkly different from one we would recognize. The most 
fundamental difference is the degree to which, from the 16th through the 
18th centuries, all aspects of theatrical performance were regulated by the 
crown.45 A monarchy that reacted to the seditious potential of the printing 
press by licensing all printing appreciated the subversive possibilities of 
public theatrical performance.46 The crown responded by criminalizing 
unlicensed theatrical presentations, limiting the legal theatres to companies 
owned and run by friends and courtiers, and requiring all scripts to be 
approved by the royal censor before the initial public performance.47 As the 
theatre in Tudor and Restoration England existed only by dint of royal 
privilege, the crown was called upon to decide disputes between rival 
theatres, and it did so: allocating plays, playwrights, or actors to one company 
 
that the assignment of the right to print and public a script or musical composition did not 
also assign the public performance right unless it said so explicitly. Id. § XXII. 
 44. See DEAZLEY, RETHINKING, supra note 41, at 154–56. 
 45. See generally OSCAR G. BROCKETT & FRANKLIN L. HILDY, HISTORY OF THE 
THEATRE 114–16, 211–14, 220–21 (9th ed. 2003). 
 46. JOHN RUSSELL STEPHENS, THE CENSORSHIP OF ENGLISH DRAMA 1824–1901, at 7 
(2010). 
 47. See, e.g., Judith Milhous, Theatre Companies and Regulation, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF BRITISH THEATRE 108 (Joseph Donahue ed., 2004) [hereinafter Milhous, 
Theatre Companies and Regulation]. 
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rather than another.48 In that sphere, questions of common law literary 
property seem to be beside the point.  
The Elizabethan and Restoration eras of British theatre history have been 
the subject of extensive study, but extrapolating from surviving documentary 
evidence requires guesswork and intuition. Current theatre historians have 
concluded that Elizabethan theatre companies paid playwrights for their 
services in essentially the same way they paid actors: playwrights received a 
salary, or participated as partners in the profits of the company, collecting a 
share of net receipts, or both.49 At least some playwrights (like actors and 
managers) who were “sharers” or partners in theatre companies were able to 
earn a living from the theatre, if not from writing plays.50 Play scripts were 
deemed to belong to the company, which decided when to produce them, 
revive them, or sell them to stationers for printing.51 After an initial reading 
of the script to the full cast, companies had scribes copy individual actors’ 
“parts” or “sides”—pages interspersing a single actor’s lines with a few 
words of cues from the end of the immediately preceding lines.52 Actors 
learned their lines from the parts, and did not see the entire play until they 
came together at the end of the rehearsal period for group rehearsal.53 
Companies were reluctant to authorize printers to publish play scripts while 
 
 48. See, e.g., JUDITH MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON AND THE MANAGEMENT OF 
LINCOLN’S INN FIELDS 1695–1708, at 15–19, 66–68, 115–16, 201–02, 209–21 (1979) 
[hereinafter MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON]; Judith Milhous & Robert D. Hume, The 
Silencing of Drury Lane in 1709, 32 THEATRE J. 427 (1980) [hereinafter Milhous & Hume, The 
Silencing of Drury Lane]. 
 49. See PAULINA KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION: WRITING FOR THE 
STAGE IN ENGLAND 1660–1710, at 17 (2004); Judith Milhous & Robert D. Hume, 
Playwrights’ Remuneration in Eighteenth Century London, 10 HARV. LIBR. BULL. 1 (Summer–Fall 
1999) [hereinafter Milhous & Hume, Playwrights’ Remuneration]; Mary I. Oates & William J. 
Baumwol, On the Economics of the Theater in Renaissance London, 74 SWED. J. ECON. 136, 149, 
156–58 (1972). 
 50. See, e.g., PETER THOMPSON, SHAKESPEARE’S PROFESSIONAL CAREER 27, 82–100 
(1992); PETER THOMPSON, SHAKESPEARE’S THEATRE 19–35, 58–87 (2d ed. 1992). 
 51. Judith Milhous concludes that theatre companies treated the physical manuscripts 
of plays as carrying with them the license to produce them. MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, 
supra note 48, at 16–17. While one could argue that that practice manifests some precursor 
common law public performance right in unpublished scripts, the reason is likely more 
prosaic. Throughout this period, theatrical performances required a license from the Master 
of the Revels confirming that the play script had met the censor’s approval. The Master of 
the Revels affixed his license stamp to the promptbook, so a company’s possession of a 
promptbook with license stamp was essential evidence of the lawfulness of a production. See 
JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, BEN JOHNSON AND POSSESSIVE AUTHORSHIP 31 (2002).  
 52. See TIFFANY STERN, REHEARSAL FROM SHAKESPEARE TO SHERIDAN 10–12, 149–
51 (2000); Judith Milhous, The First Production of Rowe’s “Jane Shore,” 38 THEATRE J. 309, 312 
(1986). 
 53. See STERN, supra note 52, at 61–79. 
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they were still part of the active repertory, but were more eager to publish in 
years in which the theatres were closed because of political unrest, royal 
death, plague, or fire.54 Unauthorized printings were common and typically 
rife with errors.  
The Protestant Revolution closed the theatres completely in 1642, and 
they remained closed until Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660.55 
King Charles granted royal patents56 to two courtiers to run theatre 
companies in London, and prohibited competing theatrical performances.57 
Charles had enjoyed attending theatrical performances during his exile in 
France, and ordered his new English theatres to cast women in female roles, 
after the French fashion.58 The crown drew up a list of extant plays and 
allotted them exclusively to one company or the other, prohibiting each 
company from performing plays granted to the other.59 The division was 
unequal. Thomas Killigrew’s King’s Company received most of the popular 
plays. William Davenant’s Duke’s Company was less fortunate.60 Davenant, 
therefore, needed to commission new scripts. As the Duke’s Company 
staged new plays, the King’s Company found that it needed to find new 
 
 54. See LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 29–31; MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra 
note 48, at 16–17; Milhous & Hume, Playwrights’ Remuneration, supra note 49, at 35. Scholars 
have surmised that some of the unauthorized editions were pieced together from actors’ 
parts and actors’ memory. See, e.g., GEORGE IAN DUTHIE, THE “BAD” QUARTO OF HAMLET: 
A CRITICAL STUDY 29–36 (1941); W. Mathews, The Piracies of Love a La Mode, 10 REV. ENG. 
STUD. 311, 315 (1934); see also 1 JOHN BERNARD, RETROSPECTIONS OF THE STAGE 128 
(Boston, Carter & Hendee 1832). 
 55. During this period, theatre companies that had previously refused to publish their 
scripts made them available to printers. See KEWES, supra note 49, at 183. 
 56. Royal letters patent were monopoly privileges conferred by the king or queen. They 
were not limited to technological inventions. See generally CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING 
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM 1660–1800, at 10–39 
(1988). 
 57. See Joseph Donahue, The Theatre from 1600 to 1800, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF BRITISH THEATRE, supra note 47, at 3, 4–8. Ireland also had a single theatre company by 
dint of a royal patent granted in 1661. Scotland had none. See Gorel Garlick, Theatre Outside 
London, 1660–1775, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH THEATRE, supra note 47, at 
165–70. 
 58. See generally ELIZABETH HOWE, THE FIRST ENGLISH ACTRESSES: WOMEN AND 
DRAMA 1660–1700, at 19–24 (1992); MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 4–7. 
 59. See Robert D. Hume, Theatres and Repertory, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
BRITISH THEATRE, supra note 47, at 53, 55. 
 60. See KEWES, supra note 49, at 13–15; MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, 
at 4–20. Killigrew’s company had a much larger proportion of established actors who had 
been well-known before the revolution. Milhous speculates that Killigrew may have staked 
his claim to the lion’s share of extant English repertory on the basis of his actors’ prior 
connections to those plays. See id. at 17. 
1381-1426 LITMAN 103010 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2010  11:41 AM 
1392 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1381 
scripts to compete for audiences.61 As before, the new scripts appear to have 
become the property of the company that first staged them.62 Playwright 
compensation, however, was no longer by salary or ownership share unless 
the playwright was also a member of the acting company. Rather, both 
companies appear to have settled on a compensation system under which the 
playwright would receive the net proceeds of a single performance, typically 
the third night, and, if the production proved to run longer than a few days, 
might be offered the net proceeds of an additional performance or two.63 
While the benefit performance might earn a lot of money for an 
exceptionally successful play, the receipts were usually more modest. The 
division of the repertory between the companies meant that neither theatre 
company needed to worry that a competing theatre would perform its scripts. 
Perhaps as a result, the companies seem to have grown more interested in 
printing and publishing plays after their initial run. In at least some cases, the 
companies allowed the playwright to pocket the stationer’s payment for the 
script.64 The amount of money printers paid for play scripts, though, was not 
substantial.65  
Despite the royal constraints limiting competition, the two companies 
were unable to sustain their operations. By 1682, the King’s Company was 
insolvent, and the Duke’s Company absorbed its remnants, including its 
 
 61. See KEWES, supra note 49, at 13–20. Lacking a ready-made popular repertory, 
Davenant’s Duke’s company appears to have competed by offering productions featuring 
more impressive changeable scenery and special effects. See MILHOUS, THOMAS 
BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 20–25. That strategy proved to be successful; Killigrew shortly 
had to build a new theatre to accommodate new audience demand for expensive sets. Id. at 
12. 
 62. ROBERT D. HUME, THE RAKISH STAGE: STUDIES IN ENGLISH DRAMA 1660–1800, 
at 277 (1983); KEWES, supra note 49, at 15; MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, 
at 15–16. Throughout this period, companies freely adapted plays in their repertory to 
respond to changing audience tastes, more stringent crown censorship, or changes in acting 
personnel. 
 63. See KEWES, supra note 49, at 13–20; Milhous & Hume, Playwrights’ Remuneration, 
supra note 49, at 4. Because the recipient of the benefit paid the costs attributable to that 
performance, managers could stage benefit performances at little risk to company finances. 
By the end of the 17th century, theatre companies also offered benefit performances to star 
actors, as bonuses in addition to or in lieu of salary. See Judith Milhous, United Company 
Finances, 1682–1692, 7 THEATRE RES. INT’L 37 (1982) (reconstructing the finances of the the 
theatre company formed in 1682 by combining the Kings Company and the Duke’s 
Company into a single “United Company”) [hereinafter Milhous, United Company Finances]. 
 64. See Judith Milhous & Robert D. Hume, Dating Play Premieres from Publication Data 
1660–1700, 22 HARV. LIBR. BULL. 374, 395–96 (1974) [hereinafter Milhous & Hume, Dating 
Play Premieres from Publication Data] (quoting Colley Cibber’s 1696 contract). 
 65. See KEWES, supra note 49, at 24.  
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theatre building and its repertory of plays.66 The United Company was now 
the sole licensed theatre in London, with an ample stock of established 
drama. The company’s theatrical seasons were heavily dominated by revivals 
from that repertory, and it was well placed to turn a profit.67 The inheritors 
of shares of the patent for the original companies, now sharers in the United 
Company, were able to attract investors to buy their interests.68 The investors 
brought in new management with no theatrical experience.69 The new 
manager (a lawyer) sought to increase the United Company’s profit margins, 
by reforming practices that seemed to him to be economically unsound. He 
sought to retire aging actors and cast younger performers in their roles, to 
present fewer shows, to reduce the compensation and benefits the company 
traditionally paid its actors, and to rein in spending for popular scenery and 
special effects.70  
The actors rebelled. In 1694, fifteen of the United Company’s best-
known actors petitioned the Lord Chamberlain to hear their complaints, 
explaining that they found current management of the company was “soe 
intolerable & heavy that unless relieved wee are not able to act any longer.”71 
The Lord Chamberlain granted the rebels permission to withdraw from the 
United Company and form a rival company licensed to perform “all manner 
of Comdyes & Tragedyes, Playes, Interludes & Opera’s and to performe all 
other Theatricall and musicall Entertainments of what kind soever.”72 The 
United Company got to keep the theatre buildings, costumes, sets, special 
effects equipment, and the Killigrew and Davenant patents, but its most 
famous actors had left, taking with them royal permission to perform any 
play in the United Company’s repertory.73 
 
 66. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 31–37. Milhous places most 
of the blame for the King Company’s demise on Killigrew, whom she characterizes as a 
poor theatrical manager. Id. at 37. 
 67. See generally Milhous, United Company Finances, supra note 63, at 37 (assessing the 
“startling amount of money [that] flowed through the United Company”). 
 68. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 40–43, 51–62; Milhous, 
Theatre Companies and Regulation, supra note 47, at 114. 
 69. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 59, 62; PAUL SAWYER, 
CHRISTOPHER RICH OF DRURY LANE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A THEATRE MANAGER 9–18 
(1986). 
 70. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 59–66; WATSON 
NICHOLSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR A FREE STAGE IN LONDON 7–9 (1966). 
 71. See The Petition of the Players, reprinted in MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra 
note 48, at 225, 226. 
 72. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 64–67. 
 73. See id. at 67–72. 
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The rebel actors formed a rival company as an actors’ cooperative, while 
the manager of the patent company continued to treat it as a business 
investment.74 Both companies relied heavily on productions from their 
repertory, mounting relatively few new scripts.75 Occasionally they competed 
by trying to usurp one another’s plays,76 but the strategy proved commercially 
unrewarding.77  
Neither company prospered. The actors’ company lacked the capital to 
build or renovate a suitable theatre, and its sharers, though famous, were 
aging.78 Meanwhile, whether because of mismanagement or fraud, the patent 
company was unable to pay its investors, its actors or its rent.79 Audience 
tastes were changing—increasingly, the crowds preferred spectacle, music, 
dance, and circus acts to drama or comedy.80 At the turn of the century, 
British moral reformers targeted theatres as particular dens of vice and 
indicted actors for onstage indecency.81 Both the actors’ company and the 
patent company let bills go unpaid. Actors and investors complained that the 
managers of both companies were pocketing money rather than honoring 
their obligations.82 
Queen Anne’s Lord Chamberlain intervened repeatedly in efforts to 
reconfigure the two companies into a viable theatre.83 In 1708, he reunited 
the acting company. He ordered that operas might be performed exclusively 
in one theatre, that tragedies and comedies might be performed exclusively in 
the other, and that nobody except for the managers of the two theatres 
 
 74. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 68–97; Milhous, Theatre 
Companies and Regulation, supra note 47, at 114–15; SAWYER, supra note 69, at 25–31.  
 75. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 97–112, 139–50. 
 76. Thus, in November of 1704, both companies appear to have staged revivals of 
Shakepeare’s Henry IV. See Season of 1704–1705, in 1 THE LONDON STAGE 1660–1800 – 
PART 2: 1700–1729, at 179, 192, 195–96 (Judith Milhous & Robert D. Hume eds., interim 
version 2001) (1960), available at 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/hb1/London%20Stage%202001/lond1704.pdf. 
 77. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 131–32, 174. 
 78. Id. at 88, 113–24, 161. 
 79. Id. at 124–25, 154–68; SAWYER, supra note 69, at 40. 
 80. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 133–44, 188; SAWYER, supra 
note 69, at 31–35, 43–44. 
 81. See Season of 1704–1705, supra note 76; Milhous, Theatre Companies and Regulation, 
supra note 47, at 116 
 82. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 161–62, 167; Milhous, Theatre 
Companies and Regulation, supra note 47, at 117–18. 
 83. See NICHOLSON, supra note 70, at 8–19; STERN, supra note 52, at 126–28. 
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would be permitted to produce theatrical entertainment.84 The opera theatre 
soon found that its expenses dwarfed its receipts; the manager of the 
dramatic theatre refused to pay his actors full salaries. In 1709, the actors 
again petitioned the Lord Chamberlain to intervene. This time, the Lord 
Chamberlain ordered the patent theatre to close down.85 He ousted the 
patent company’s manager, and reorganized the company under different 
managers. To lessen inter-company competition, he restricted each 
company’s performance dates.86 
The picture that emerges from a look at 16th and 17th English century 
theatre history is of an industry closely supervised by the crown, which 
licensed theatre companies, play performance, and play printing, and 
intervened in disputes over repertory, personnel, performance schedule, 
competition, and compensation. Theatre managers valued playwrights as they 
valued actors, and paid them in the same fashion. Scripts once acquired 
entered a theatre company’s repertory, where they could be revived, adapted, 
rewritten, performed, and printed without any further license from the 
writer.87 Although there is some evidence suggestive of a custom that actors 
presumptively owned an interest in continuing to play the parts they had 
performed in the past,88 the limited competition in the English theatre during 
these years, together with the royal restrictions forbidding actors to defect to 
rival companies without royal permission, make it difficult to verify whether 
the custom had much force. It seems clear, though, that at the time 
Parliament adopted the Statute of Anne, playwrights enjoyed no common 
 
 84. See MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 189–221; Robert D. Hume, 
The Sponsorship of Opera in London 1704–1720, 85 MOD. PHILOLOGY 420, 423–29 (1988); 
Milhous & Hume, The Silencing of Drury Lane, supra note 48, at 430–32. 
 85. See Milhous & Hume, The Silencing of Drury Lane, supra note 48, at 435–40. 
 86. See id. at 435–47. 
 87. See, e.g., STERN, supra note 52, at 129–31, 241–45 (George Villier’s The Rehearsal 
written in 1664 and then rewritten repeatedly between 1667 and 1776 to revamp its 
protagonist to parody different contemporary dramatists); see also COLLEY CIBBER, THE 
TRAGICAL HISTORY OF KING RICHARD III (1700) (cut-and-paste job of Shakespeare’s 
Henry VI and Richard III with Cibber’s additional dialogue).  
 88. See STERN, supra note 52, at 149–51 (reporting that actors were deemed to own 
their parts); see also MILHOUS, THOMAS BETTERTON, supra note 48, at 17 (reporting that in 
1660 the King’s company laid claim to most of the preexisting repertory on the ground that 
its veteran actors had performed those plays). The apparent custom may represent no more 
than the practical difficulty of preventing an actor from continuing to perform a role once 
she had memorized her part. But see Morris v. Kelly, 37 Eng. Rep. 451 (1820) (enjoining 
actress from performing play at a theatre other than the one that alleged ownership of the 
copyright and could prove ownership of the promptbook). 
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law literary property right in their scripts,89 and the pervasive regulation of 
theatre left little room for such a right to arise. 
The Statute of Anne made no immediate observable difference in the lot 
of dramatists. 
B. ENGLISH THEATRE FROM THE STATUTE OF ANNE TO THE 1833 
DRAMATIC LITERARY PROPERTY ACT  
Queen Anne died in 1714, to be succeeded by George I. The Hanover 
kings were not particularly interested in theatre, and actors were no longer 
deemed even honorary members of the royal household.90 Throughout the 
18th century, small theatre companies sprang up to compete with the two 
patent theatres, but extensive government regulation and uncertain finances 
kept them from gaining a foothold.91 In 1737, Parliament passed the 
Licensing Act, which limited performance of legitimate drama to the two 
patent theatre companies and required that any script be vetted by the Lord 
Chamberlain before its first performance.92 Theatre historians report that the 
licensing act essentially shut down opportunities for playwrights to place new 
scripts, and many dramatists shifted their efforts to poetry or novels. Even 
 
 89. See, e.g., GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
104–05 (1847); DEAZLEY, RETHINKING, supra note 41, at 155; 2 JAMES APPLETON 
MORGAN, THE LAW OF LITERATURE 286–87 (1875). 
 90. See, e.g., Hume, supra note 59, at 57. 
 91. See HUME, supra note 62, at 279–307. Debate over the continuing validity of the 
royal patents, which had not been officially confirmed by Parliament, apparently 
emboldened several managers to open unlicensed theaters in or near London. The holders 
of interests in the two theatre patents went to court repeatedly to close these efforts down 
and to prevent performers from defecting to unlicensed venues. See BROCKETT & HILDY, 
supra note 45, at 220–21. Further afield, a Dublin theatre successfully fended off a lawsuit 
seeking to enjoin its production of Sheridan’s Duenna brought by the patent theatre that 
claimed to have purchased all rights froim Sheridan. See The Monthly Chronologer: Ireland – 
Dublin, April 26, THE LONDON MAGAZINE, OR, GENTLEMEN’S MONTHLY INTELLIGENCER, 
May 1770, at 279 (reporting Chancery decision that plaintiff was not entitled to an 
injunction). I am indebted to Tomás Gómez-Aroztegui for bringing this case to my 
attention. 
 92. Theatrical Licensing Act of June 21, 1737, 10 Geo. II c. 28. See DAVID THOMAS, 
DAVID CARTER, & ANNE ETIENNE, THEATRE CENSORSHIP FROM WALPOLE TO WILSON 
(2007). According to Brockett, within a few years, managers began to evade the Licensing 
Act by selling tickets to concerts and offering dramatic entertainment for free. See 
BROCKETT & HILDY, supra note 45, at 221. By the 1780s, some of the larger towns outside 
of London had persuaded Parliament to license theatres in their towns, or empower local 
magistrates to do so. Id.  
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though the vast majority of productions came from the extant repertory, 
though, the two patent companies produced several new scripts every year.93  
With their opportunities at home constrained, some British actors 
formed companies to tour in the New World. Others sought to perform 
outside of London or in venues on the outskirts of the city, in competition 
with the patent companies, avoiding the prohibition by styling their 
productions as “concerts” or “burlettas” rather than dramas, comedies, or 
plays.94 
Toward the end of the 18th century, theatre companies began to contract 
with some authors to allow them to keep their statutory copyrights, and 
contract directly with stationers, in return for less money.95 In 1794, the two 
patent theatres started paying flat fees rather than benefits.96 Both companies 
had built larger houses to accommodate larger audiences, and they imposed 
the change to limit the amounts they needed to pay playwrights for new 
scripts. Historians Judith Milhous and Robert Hume have examined the 
account books of one of the patent theatres and concluded that, on average, 
playwrights collected more money under the new system than they would 
have under the old.97 By the end of the 18th century it was becoming 
possible for at least some playwrights to earn a living writing for the theatre.  
C. STATUTORY PLAY RIGHT IN ENGLAND 
Edward Bulwer-Lytton is known to modern American audiences as the 
author of the phrase “[i]t was a dark and Stormy night,”98 and the namesake 
of an annual contest for overwrought prose.99 Bulwer-Lytton was a popular 
novelist, a poet, a baron, and a Member of Parliament.100 By the late 1820s, 
the patent theatres were deeply in debt and smaller, competing theatres had 
 
 93. See Hume, supra note 59, at 67–70; HUME, supra note 62, at 307–11; Milhous, Theatre 
Companies and Regulation, supra note 47, at 108, 122–24. 
 94. See JOHN RUSSELL STEPHENS, THE CENSORSHIP OF ENGLISH DRAMA 1824–1901, 
at 7–9 (1980). 
 95. See Milhous & Hume, Playwrights’ Remuneration, supra note 49, at 35–43; 3 
ALLARDYCE NICOLL, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH DRAMA 1660–1900, at 47 (1952). 
 96. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON DRAMATIC 
LITERATURE WITH MINUTES OF EVIDENCE (1832), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22uk_1832%22; Milhouse & Hume, Playwrights’ 
Remuneration, supra note 49, at 6–7. 
 97. Milhouse & Hume, Playwrights’ Remuneration, supra note 49, at 26–27. 
 98. EDWARD GEORGE BULWER-LYTTON, PAUL CLIFFORD 13 (1830). 
 99. THE BULWER-LYTTON FICTION CONTEST, http://www.bulwer-lytton.com (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 100.  See generally LESLIE MITCHELL, BULWER LYTTON: THE RISE AND FALL OF A 
VICTORIAN MAN OF LETTERS (2003). 
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sprung up.101 Licensed by the crown to perform musical entertainment and 
burlettas, they insisted that they could produce dramas, comedies, and 
melodramas so long as they interspersed them in bills with non-dramatic 
entertainment. The managers of the patent companies claimed that the non-
patent theatres bore significant responsibility for patent companies’ financial 
troubles and pursued legal campaigns to shut the non-patent theatres 
down.102 In 1832, residents of London presented a petition protesting the 
prosecutions of upstart theatre companies. Bulwer-Lytton moved to establish 
a Select Committee on Dramatic Literature.103 Appointed chairman of the 
Committee, he held hearings, inviting testimony from playwrights, actors, 
managers, and government officials.104 The picture that the witnesses 
presented portrayed a lively environment of non-patent theatres operating 
under limited licenses but producing dramas and comedies in defiance of the 
patent companies’ assertions of exclusive rights.105 Play scripts were readily 
available. In order to claim copyright under the extant statute, it was 
necessary to publish and register a play as a book. Once published, however, 
a play could be performed by any theatre that could get its hands on a 
script—the performance rights in published plays were universally 
understood to be in the public domain.106  
When there had been only two theatre companies, the risk from 
competition was small, since the companies appear to have followed an 
informal practice of declining to poach each other’s scripts or actors. In 
those circumstances, publication of a new play netted the company or 
playwright some extra money from the publisher without threatening 
performance revenues. As new theaters sprang up, though, they helped 
 
 101. See Jane Moody, The Theatrical Revolution, 1776–1843, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY 
OF BRITISH THEATRE, supra note 47, at 199, 200–10. 
 102. See REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON DRAMATIC LITERATURE, supra note 96, 
at 21–116; see, e.g., Morris v. Kelly, (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 451. A complicating factor was that 
managers of the patent theatres mortgaged their shares and defaulted on the loans, giving 
creditors control of the companies. The creditors frequently failed to pay the actors what 
they had promised, so the actors had significant incentives to seek additional or alternative 
work. See id. 
 103. See Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833, PRIMARY 
SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, eds., 2008), 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22uk_1833%22. 
 104. See id.; NICHOLSON, supra note 70, at 325–34. 
 105. See generally REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON DRAMATIC LITERATURE, supra 
note 96, at 9 (reproducing hearing transcripts). 
 106. E.g., DEAZLEY, RETHINKING, supra note 41, at 154–55.  
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themselves to the plays in the patent companies’ repertories.107 Forgoing 
publication was no longer a feasible long term option: publishers were 
notorious for sending stenographers to attend unpublished plays and write 
down all the dialogue, so that they could publish unlicensed printed versions 
of the scripts.108 Since unpublished plays were not subject to copyright 
protection, the publishers risked little.109 Bulwer-Lytton asked all of his 
witnesses whether the theatre would be improved if the patent theatres lost 
their monopoly, and whether better plays would result if all theatre 
companies needed to compensate playwrights for performing plays.110 
Witnesses answered variously,111 but Bulwer-Lytton intended to pursue both 
reforms. 
In August of 1832, the Committee delivered a report calling for the 
expansion of copyright in dramatic literature to give writers control of public 
performances of their plays, and the termination of the patent theatres’ 
monopoly.112 Both measures passed the House of Commons, but the House 
of Lords rejected the limitation on the patent theatres’ monopoly, viewing 
the legislation as an affront to crown prerogative.113 As of 1833, however, the 
Dramatic Literary Property Act114 enabled authors or their assignees to enjoin 
 
 107. See REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON DRAMATIC LITERATURE, supra note 96, 
at 149 (testimony of David Edward Morris, proprietor, Haymarket Theatre). 
 108. See id. at 143 (testimony of Thomas Morton, reader, Drury Lane theatre); id. at 171 
(testimony of Charles Mathews, proprietor, Delphi Theatre). 
 109. Authority on this point is not crystal clear. In Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. 
Rep. 451, the author of the unpublished farce Love a la Mode had succeeded in enjoining the 
publication of the script in a magazine on the strength of his common law copyright in his 
unpublished script. Macklin was decided after the King’s Bench decision in Milar v. Taylor, 
(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, had recognized a perpetual common law copyright in printed, 
published texts that survived the Statute of Anne, but before the House of Lords’ decision in 
Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, rejected Milar v. Taylor. After Donaldson v. Beckett 
repudiated the notion of perpetual common law copyright in published texts, it would in 
theory have been possible to argue, as playwrights later did in the United States, that so long 
as the script remained unprinted and unpublished, the common law right had not been 
abrogated by the statute. The reported cases don’t reflect such an argument’s being made 
with success in the period between Donaldson and the 1932 hearings, and Parliament’s later 
decision to equate performance with publication prevented the argument from succeeding 
later. 
 110. See, e.g., REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMM. ON DRAMATIC LITERATURE, supra note 
96, at 156–59 (testimony of Douglas Jerrold, author); id. at 170 (testimony of Charles 
Mathews, proprietor, Adelphi Theatre). 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 176 (testimony of W. Thomas Montcrieff, playwright); id. at 182 
(testimony of George Bartley, actor). 
 112. Id. at 4–6. 
 113. See Deazley, supra note 103; Dewey Ganzel, Patent Wrongs and Patent Theatres: Drama 
and Law in the Early Nineteenth Century, 76 P.M.L.A. 384, 391–92 (1961).  
 114. 3 & 4 Will.IV, c. 15 (1833). 
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unlicensed productions. Despite the new law, play writing did not suddenly 
become more remunerative. First, both theatres and publishers claimed to be 
the authors’ assignees in whom the new performance right vested. In 
Cumberland v. Planché, the court agreed that the publisher of the play owned 
the new performance right as part of its prior purchase of the copyright.115 
As importantly, the overall economic climate for theatre in mid-19th century 
London was not at all playwright-friendly.116 
In 1842, Parliament enacted a revised copyright statute, which provided 
that the dramatic performance right could be assigned separately from the 
copyright,117 and equated the first public performance of a dramatic work 
with publication.118 Literary property rights for plays were limited, at least 
from the time of the first public performance, to the rights available under 
the copyright statute. Even if one were to credit an argument that at some 
time in the past, dramatists in England, or the theatres they wrote for, could 
have claimed some literary property rights at common law to control the 
performance of their plays (and, as the past discussion indicates, I have 
concluded they could not), the enactment of the 1842 Act abrogated any 
such rights going forward. Since performance was the equivalent of 
publication for performance rights, and publication forfeited any non-
statutory copyright, British playwrights lost any common law public 
performance rights in their scripts upon the initial public performance. 
III. PLAY RIGHT IN AMERICA 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the story developed differently. The early plot 
is similar. Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 1790, including only 
reproduction and distribution rights for books, maps, and charts.119 American 
publishers argued that that law did not abrogate their perpetual common law 
copyright.120 In Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court held that it was doubtful 
 
 115. Cumberland v. Planché, (1834) 110 Eng. Rep. 1329; Deazley, supra note 103. Eight 
years later, Parliament enacted a revised copyright law that required assignment of the 
dramatic public performance right to be separately registered. See supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
 116. Deazley, supra note 103. Deazley suggests several reasons for the poor fortunes of 
dramatists following the enactment of the 1833 law, including poor management of theatre 
companies, high actor salaries and excessive production costs. Id. 
 117. See sources cited supra note 43. 
 118. British courts read the law to forfeit common law rights upon public performance 
even if that performance occurred in the United States. Boucicault v. Chatterton, (1867) 5 
Ch.D. 267.  
 119. Act of May 31, 1790, at ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 120. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 36, at 1178–85. 
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that perpetual common law copyright had ever existed in England, but, if it 
had, the colonists didn’t bring it with them when they emigrated to 
Pennsylvania, and, if they had, Congress had abrogated it for printed books 
when it enacted the 1790 Copyright Act.121 (And, had Congress not, the 
common law right had never been imagined to include public performance 
rights.) Dramatic works could be protected as books, and some were, but 
Congress did not add a dramatic performance right to the copyright law until 
1856.122 
A. EARLY AMERICAN THEATRE 
Early American theatre was chiefly a British import.123 British actors 
formed touring companies to play in the New World, bringing their plays 
with them.124 Several American colonies, especially in the north, prohibited 
all theater as immoral,125 but the southern colonies were more receptive to 
visiting British performers.126 During the Revolution, the Continental 
Congress passed resolutions banning theatrical performances as displays of 
“extravagance and dissipation.”127 Once independent, the new country had 
no international copyright relations with any European nation. All British, 
French, and German scripts, therefore, were free for the taking.128 Most 
theatre performed in the United States during the first half of the 19th 
century was old British repertory, new British imports, and American 
adaptation of scripts that had succeeded in Britain, France, and Germany. 
Copying was the norm.129  
 
 121. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (Pet. 8) 591 (1834). 
 122. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138. 
 123. ALFRED L. BERNHEIM, THE BUSINESS OF THE THEATRE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF THE THEATRE 1758–1932, at 5–7 (1932). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 6. 
 126. See id. at 6–7. 
 127. Resolution of Oct. 20, 1774, cl. 8. 
 128. See BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 20. British courts, for their part, ruled that if a 
play was initially performed in America before being copyrighted in Britain, the initial 
performance should be deemed a foreign publication, which forever forfeited any British 
copyright. Boucicault v. Delafield, (1863) 71 Eng. Rep. 261; Boucicault v. Chatterton, (1877) 
5 Ch.D. 267. 
 129. THOMAS JAMES WALSH, PLAYWRIGHTS AND POWER: A HISTORY OF THE 
DRAMATISTS GUILD 14 (1996); see BEN GRAF HENNEKE, LAURA KEENE: A BIOGRAPHY 
51–52 (1990) (explaining that theatre managers and courts interpreted US law before 1856 to 
permit a manager “to produce any play in print without permission from, or fee to, the 
author so long as she named him”); THOMAS KITTS, THE THEATRICAL LIFE OF GEORGE 
HENRY BOKER 116–17 (1994) (“Most touring stars played published texts and were 
therefore not obligated to seek permission or pay royalties.”). 
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It’s not surprising that since America imported its actors and plays from 
England, it also imported its customary practices. Actors and managers 
claimed that their payment to a playwright for a script purchased all rights in 
the script unless a written contract reserved some printing or performance 
rights to the dramatist.130 Playwrights sold all rights in a script for an initial 
flat fee, and, sometimes, the promise of a benefit performance.131 The middle 
of the nineteenth century saw the rise of American dramatists and the 
immigration of British ones choosing to become American residents and 
citizens. Both groups of writers complained about their treatment under U.S. 
law as compared with the law of Britain or France.132  
B. THE 1856 DRAMATIC COPYRIGHT ACT  
Nineteenth century American theatre involved artists who traveled 
frequently between the United States and Europe. English actors starred in 
American productions. American actors spent a season acting in London. 
American managers went to London or Paris to acquire scripts to adapt.133 
Shortly after the enactment of the English Dramatic Literary Property Act in 
1833, American writers began to lobby for a similar law here.134 Dion 
 
 130. See CLEMENT E. FOUST, THE LIFE AND DRAMATIC WORKS OF ROBERT 
MONTGOMERY BIRD 145–47 (1919) (recounting Bird’s consulting with lawyer in 
unsuccessful attempt to reclaim his copyrights from Edwin Forrest). 
 131. WALSH, supra note 129, at 10; see BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 20 (“Payments to 
dramatists did not generally burden our managers of the first half of the nineteenth 
century.”); HENNEKE, supra note 129, at 129 (all rights to Our American Cousin purchased for 
$1000). Royalties were not unheard of: Henneke reported that Keene offered to pay royalties 
for American scripts as early as the mid 1850s, id. at 51–52, and George Henry Boker is 
believed to have demanded a 5% royalty on all performances of his plays from the 1850s on. 
WALSH, supra, at 10–11. A royalty arrangement was not necessarily more remunerative. 
Boker’s Leonor de Guzman opened in 1852 in Philadelphia to excellent reviews and then 
moved to Broadway. Kitts tells us that Boker’s 5% royalty on the initial run summed to 
$159.09. KITTS, supra note 129, at 87. 
 132. See generally Oren Bracha, Commentary on the U.S. Copyright Act Amendment 1856, 
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22us_1856%22; sources cited infra note 134.  
 133. See, e.g., 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN THEATRE 7–16 (Christopher 
Bigsby & Don B. Wilmeth eds., 1999); Simon E. Williams, European Actors and the Star System 
in the American Theatre 1752–1870, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN THEATRE, 
supra, at 303; infra notes 134–35, 147–68 and accompanying text. 
 134. See FOUST, supra note 130, at 147–51; KITTS, supra note 129, at 116–18. Two of the 
most prolific and litigious playwrights of the 19th century were Dionysus Boucicault, an Irish 
playwright who became an American citizen, and Augustin Daly, a theatre manager from 
North Carolina. Boucicault and Daly collided in the most famous of 19th century us 
copyright cases, Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868), in which the court 
found that Boucicault, the author of After Dark, had plagiarized the railroad rescue scene 
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Boucicault, an Irish playwright who later became a U.S. citizen, claimed at 
least partial credit for persuading the U.S. Congress to enact the 1856 
Dramatic Copyright Act during his initial tour of the States.135 Boucicault 
may have had some role in acquainting home-grown authors of the 
differences between U.S. and European laws. The work of persuading 
Congress, though, appears to have been shouldered by American-born 
writers George Henry Boker, Robert Taylor Conrad and Robert Montgomer 
Bird, who convinced Senators Charles Sumner and William Seward to 
shepherd a bill through the Senate.136 The 1856 Act gave the author or 
proprietor of a copyrighted work, or his heirs or assigns, “the sole right . . . to 
act, perform, or represent” the work.137 As with its British counterpart, the 
act was initially invoked to vindicate the rights of authors’ assignees.138 
C. COMMON LAW RIGHTS 
In another part of the forest, the 19th century also saw the rise of the 
American legal treatise.139 Early treatises were essentially case digests, but 
their authors began to view their task more ambitiously. 19th century legal 
treatises sought to organize and explicate entire regions of law, usually by 
aligning their principles with the principles of natural law.140 The first U.S. 
 
from Daly’s Under the Gaslight. Together with Laura Keene, an expatriate Briton who became 
an American theater manager, and Charles Frohman, an American theatre manager who 
cornered the market for U.S. rights to produce of British scripts, they were responsible for 
most of the theatre-related copyright litigation in the 19th and early 20th century.  
 135. See Dion Boucicault, Leaves from a Dramatist’s Diary, 149 N. AM. REV. 228, 230 
(1889). Oren Bracha doubts that Boucicault had much to do with it. See Bracha, supra note 
132. Bracha notes that contemporary sources credit playwrights George Henry Boker, and 
Robert Montgomery Bird and New York Senator William Henry Seward as the forces 
behind the amendment. Id. Dr. Bird wrote to Boker in 1853 to encourage his efforts to 
persuade Congress to enact a dramatic copyright bill, but it is unlikely that he was directly 
involved in drafting the bill. Bird’s health was poor, and he died in 1854. See FOUST, supra 
note 130, at 147–50 (reprinting letter); id. at 150–52 (describing Bird’s final illness and death). 
Bracha speculates, however, that Bird might have been behind an 1841 effort to secure 
performance rights for playwrights. Bracha, supra note 132. Boucicault also claimed to have 
established the entitlement of European playwrights to royalties for performances of their 
plays. See Boucicault, supra, at 229. 
 136. See KITTS, supra note 129, at 118–26; Dramatic Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1856, 
at 4. 
 137. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138, 139. 
 138. See, e.g., Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867); Roberts v. Myers, 
20 F. Cas. 898 (C.C.D. Mass. 1860). 
 139. A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of 
Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 671–74 (1981). 
 140. Id. 
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copyright treatise is usually deemed to be Curtis’s.141 Curtis articulated a 
natural rights basis for literary property, deriving from the author’s initial 
exclusive possession of the work that he created. Curtis insisted, however, 
that the right was inherently limited to “the exclusive multiplication of copies 
of that particular combination of characters, which exhibits to the eye of 
another the ideas that he intends shall be received.”142 The legislative 
truncation of its term (from forever to a term of years) was appropriate, he 
wrote, because after two or three generations, administering it would be too 
difficult for society to tolerate.143 Curtis also thought that a dramatist’s 
common law right in a published play would not extend to “the sole right of 
presentation upon the stage.”144 
The first reported American cases claiming common law performance 
rights in plays followed the enactment of a statutory performance right for 
dramatic works and were initially cast as copyright suits brought under the 
provisions of the 1856 Act. Plaintiffs claimed copyrights in their plays, but 
had failed to satisfy the statutory prerequisites. The earliest cases excused the 
failure to meet statutory formalities,145 but later courts held that the statute’s 
performance right was available only for properly registered works that met 
all statutory requirements.146  
 
 141. CURTIS, supra note 89. Curtis’s treatise was later plagiarized by the Bristish treatise 
author Walter A Copinger, who liberally incorporated Curtis prose into his 1870 book, 
COPINGER’S LAW OF COPYRIGHT. See id.; Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Copinger’s Law of 
Copyright (1870), PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer eds., 2008), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-
bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabeCom/%22uk_1870%22. Because negotiations on 
international copyright protection had stalled, there was not yet anything illegal about such 
appropriation. 
 142. CURTIS, supra note 89, at 13. 
 143. Id. at 24.  
 144. Id. at 104.  
 145. See Roberts v. Myers, 20 F. Cas. 898, 899 (C.C.D. Mass. 1860). 
 146. The 1831 Copyright Act made copyright available to authors who were U.S. 
citizens or residents, or the authors’ assigns, upon recording of the title of the work, deposit 
of the title page before publication, publication, payment of a fifty-cent recording fee, notice 
inserted on the title page of all published copies, and deposit within three months of 
publication of a copy of the work with the clerk of the court. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, at ch. 16, 4 
Stat. 436 §§ 1, 4, 5. Congress replaced the 1831 Act with the general revision of 1870. The 
major innovations of the 1870 Act were transferring registration and recording functions 
from the clerks of the courts to the Library of Congress, and expanding copyright rights to 
allow authors to reserve the exclusive right to dramatize or translate their own works. 
Copyright remained available only to authors (or the assigns of authors) who were U.S. 
citizens or residents, and continued to require recordation, a fifty-cent fee, publication, 
deposit, and notice as prerequisites. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 §§ 86, 90, 92, 
93, 97. 
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Dion Boucicault followed the practice of registering and depositing the 
title page of his plays without publishing his scripts.147 In England, this would 
have sufficed to secure statutory copyright.148 In the United States, however, 
most courts ultimately insisted that the publication of printed copies was a 
condition of statutory copyright.149 Early suits to enforce the new 
performance right succeeded even with defects in copyright registration. In 
Roberts v. Myers, the purported assignee of Dion Boucicault’s copyright in The 
Octoroon sought a preliminary injunction under the 1856 Act to prevent an 
unlicensed production.150 It transpired that Bouccicault had registered the 
title page of the play with the clerk of the court, but neglected to deposit the 
required printed copies.151 Indeed, he had not yet published the play. Judge 
Sprague read the statutory language to permit him to grant the preliminary 
injunction: “The statute requires that such copy shall be deposited within 
three months after publication. That time has not arrived. There has been no 
publication.”152 
In a later lawsuit over the same play, the judge expressed more concern 
that Boucicault had not perfected his statutory copyright.153 Judge Shipman 
nonetheless read Roberts v. Myers to stand for the proposition that Boucicault 
could either rely on a statutory copyright or he could recover on the basis of 
common law rights in his unpublished manuscript.154 In Boucicault v. Hart, 
however, Judge Hunt ruled the purported copyright registration of another 
Boucicault play invalid. The judge explained: 
[T]o secure a copyright of a book or a dramatic composition, the 
work must be published within a reasonable time after the filing of 
 
 147. See, e.g., Boucicault v. Wood, 3 F. Cas. 988 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1867); Boucicault v. Fox, 
3 F. Cas. 977 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862). See also supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
Dionysus Boucicault was an extremely prolific playwright born in Ireland who immigrated to 
the United States in the latter half of the 19th century. Copyright nerds know him as the 
author of After Dark, the play found to have plagiarized the railroad rescue scene from Under 
the Gaslight. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); Daly v. Webster, 56 F. 483 (2d Cir. 1892); 
Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868). Both Boucicault and Daly faced 
multiple charges of plagiarism in their careers. Many of their plays were adapted or revised 
versions of material written by others. 
 148. See supra note 43. 
 149. Koppel v. Downing, 11 App. D.C. 93 (1897); Carillo v. Shook, 5 F. Cas, 68 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876); Boucicault v. Hart, 3 F. Cas. 983 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); Benn v. 
LeClercq, 3 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873). But see Roberts, 20 F. Cas. at 899 (enjoining 
performance of unpublished script). 
 150. Roberts, 20 F. Cas. at 899. 
 151. Id. at 898–99. 
 152. Id. at 899. 
 153. Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862). 
 154. Id. at 980–81. 
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the title page, and two copies be delivered to the librarian. These 
two acts are, by the statute, made necessary to be performed, and 
we can no more take it upon ourselves to say that the latter is not 
an indispensable requisite to a copyright, than we can say it of the 
former.155 
Finding that Boucicault had failed to secure a copyright in his play, the 
court dismissed the case. Judge Hunt expressed the view that defendant had 
invaded Boucicault’s “common law right of ownership in his dramatic 
composition.” Because the parties were citizens of the same state, though, 
the federal court had no jurisdiction to grant the remedy to which Boucicault 
was entitled under common law.156 
Laura Keene, a New York actor-manager and the assignee of the 
American rights to Tom Taylor’s Our American Cousin,157 sued a competitor 
under the copyright statute to enjoin an unlicensed performance. The court 
found Keene’s copyright invalid because it derived from an author who was 
neither a citizen nor a resident of the United States.158 The court allowed 
Keene to recover damages on a breach of confidence theory: defendants had 
suborned one of Keene’s actors and caused him to reveal all of the 
alterations Keene had made to the script and all of the stage business 
performed in her production.159  
As an alternative ground, the court suggested, Keene should be able to 
recover on a common law literary property theory.160 The common law cause 
of action Judge Cadwalader announced was peculiarly cramped. If the 
 
 155. 3 F. Cas. 983, 986 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875); accord Koppel v. Downing, 11 App. D.C. 
93 (1897); Carillo v. Shook, 5 F. Cas. 68 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876); Benn v. LeClercq, 3 F. Cas. 
201 (C.C.D. Mass. 1873). 
 156. Boucicault, 3 F. Cas. at 987–88. The December 17, 1876 issue of the New York Times 
reports that the case settled out of court. Court Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1876, at 10. 
 157. The play is best known for being the play being performed at the Ford Theatre the 
night that John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Lincoln.  
 158. Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 185, 191 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861). Taylor was 
British. Keene was not yet an American citizen but had been a U.S. resident for many years. 
She had registered the copyright under the title Our Country Cousin, in her own name as 
proprietor on October 2, 1858. See HENNEKE, supra note 129, at 91, 129–43. (Keene had 
also failed to publish the script as a printed book and deposit copies with the clerk of the 
court, but the judge excused that on the same reasoning adopted in Roberts v. Myers, see Keene, 
14 F. Cas. at 185). Contemporary legal writers interpreted the opinion to hold that a resident 
alien could not copyright the works of a non-resident alien. See James Appleton Morgan, An 
International Copyright Law, 3 FORUM 35, 37–38 (1875). Professor Henneke claimed that the 
case motivated Keene to become a naturalized US citizen to avoid future copyright 
problems. See HENNEKE, supra note 129, at 111.  
 159. HENNEKE, supra note 129, at 188. 
 160. Keene, 14 F. Cas. at 201–08. 
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proprietor of a play authorized publication, and the printed script enabled a 
competitor to mount an unlicensed performance, then, absent statutory 
copyright, the performance was not actionable. Similarly, if the proprietor 
authorized a public performance, and that performance enabled an 
unlicensed production, that production was lawful unless the proprietor had 
a valid statutory copyright in the script. Where, however the public 
performance was not what enabled the defendant to present an unauthorized 
production, the proprietor’s reserved literary property rights would support a 
lawsuit.161  
Keene then filed a state court action to enjoin a second unlicensed 
production of Our American Cousin at the Boston Museum, relying on 
Massachusetts common law.162 The state court cited Judge Cadwalader’s 
analysis with approval, but dismissed the case nonetheless, holding that  
These principles sustain the demurrer to the plaintiff’s bill. She has 
publicly represented the play, Our American Cousin, before audiences 
consisting of all persons who chose to pay the price charged for 
admission to her theatre. She has employed actors to commit the 
various parts to memory; and unless they are restrained by some 
contract, express or implied, we can perceive no legal reason why 
they might not repeat what they have learned, before different 
audiences, and in various places. If persons, by frequent attendance 
at her theatre, have committed to memory any part or the whole of 
the play, they have a right to repeat what they heard to others. We 
know of no right of property in gestures, tones, or scenery, which 
would forbid such reproduction of them by the spectators as their 
powers of imitation might enable them to accomplish.163 
 
 161. Id. at 207. 
The case recapitulated stands thus: The complainant having the literary 
proprietorship of this comedy, but no statutory copyright in it, and having 
publicly performed it at her theatre, with an intention to continue its 
public performance there, the defendants, against her will, performed it 
repeatedly at their theatre, without having been, directly or secondarily, 
enabled so to do through its impression upon the memory of any of her 
audience. This was an infraction of a proprietary right retained by the 
complainant. Independently also of such right, she is entitled to redress, 
because the defendants enabled themselves to represent the play by 
knowingly taking advantage of a breach of confidence committed by a 
person in her employment. 
Id. 
 162. Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 545 (1860). 
 163. Id. at 551. 
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Crowe v. Aiken164 involved a second Tom Taylor script, this one titled 
Mary Warner. Taylor wrote the play for the actress Kate Bateman, and 
assigned the U.S. stage rights to her husband.165 After Bateman performed 
the play in London, she and her husband traveled to New York and 
performed the play there. Neither Taylor nor plaintiff’s husband sought 
registration under the U.S. copyright statute, nor authorized the play’s 
publication. Defendant purchased a copy of the script and sought to stage 
the play in Chicago. Bateman’s husband sued to enjoin him, “based not upon 
any copyright statutes, but on the principles of the common law and of 
equity.” Judge Drummond examined the copy of the script, and found it 
suspicious. “It is not in the usual form of a published play, but consists of 
printed slips fastened together in pamphlet form, with plats and stage 
directions as if for dramatic use only.”166 Concluding that the defendant’s 
script was created in some unauthorized or wrongful way, and not by 
memory only, the court entered a preliminary injunction.167 
Finally, in 1878, a New York trial court enjoined a San Francisco 
production of an unpublished English adaptation of a French play at the 
behest of the assignee of the assignees of the British adapters, relying on the 
common law rights attaching to unpublished manuscripts.168 
 
 164. 6 F. Cas. 904 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1870). 
 165. Why the husband? Parliament didn’t enact the Married Women’s Property Acts 
until later. See Married Women’s Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.); Married 
Women’s Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.).  
 166. Id. at 905. 
 167. Id. at 907. The rule that it was not copyright infringement to reproduce a script 
from memory (as distinguished from stenography or purloined parts) persisted, showing up 
in statutory as well as non statutory play right cases. See, e.g., Shook v. Rankin, 21 F. Cas. 
1337 (C.C.D. Minn. 1875). The durability of the rule supports an inference that many 19th 
century courts continued to view copyright as conferring rights related to making and 
distributing material objects rather than rights in intangible works of authorship. For a 
different piece of evidence supporting that inference, see Edward S. Rogers, The Law of 
Dramatic Copyright, 1 MICH. L. REV. pt. 2, 179, at 184 (1902) (“The reason why public 
performance of an unpublished uncopyrighted play is not a dedication, may be very briefly 
stated: The author does not part with his manuscript, and no copies are made so that the 
public can have access to the work itself.”). 
 168. French v. Maguire, 55 How. Pr. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878). The plaintiff, Samuel 
French, founded the Samuel French dramatic licensing agency in 1830. See SAMUEL FRENCH, 
INC., http://www.samuelfrench.com (last visited July 31, 2010). Other cases during this time 
frame upheld common law first printing rights for unpublished manuscripts. See, e.g., Palmer 
v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872) (upholding an injunction against the printing of an 
unpublished play). 
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Copyright Office records before 1978 are neither as complete nor as 
reliable as one might wish,169 but a Copyright Office publication listing every 
dramatic composition registered between 1870 and 1916 suggests that many 
dramatists may have sought to register their copyrights without publishing 
their scripts, despite the fact that the statute did not permit it until 1909. The 
preface explains: 
Under the legislation in force from July 8, 1870 to July 1, 1909, it 
was customary to file the title-page of the drama in advance of the 
deposit of copies and subsequently deposit the required copies. 
The result has been that a great many titles were filed for 
registration which were not followed by the deposit of copies. This 
was especially so in the case of dramas, and it is estimated that in 
more than 20,000 cases, while the title has been recorded, no 
copies have been received.170 
We don’t know how many of those 20,000 plays were claimed by authors 
or proprietors who didn’t know they needed to print, publish and deposit 
copies to perfect their rights, how many were deliberately not published to 
discourage unlicensed performance, and how many simply went through a 
title change before they were finalized. It seems likely, though, that 
Boucicault, Keene, and Bateman were not alone in believing themselves to 
have secured federal copyright protection.171  
Thus, by the late-1870s, the health of a common law public performance 
right in plays was not yet robust. The claim that common law literary 
property extended far enough to permit dramatists and their assigns to 
control public performances had initially been raised as an afterthought to 
failed statutory copyright claims.172 Courts had recognized common law 
 
 169. See Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song, 56 J. COPR. SOC’Y 
335, 423–26 (2009). 
 170. 1 LIBRARY OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DRAMATIC COMPOSITIONS 
COPYRIGHTED IN THE UNITED STATES 1870 TO 1916, at i (1918). 
 171. See also Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (dismissing suit for 
infringement of “unprinted play, copyrighted in 1901” on other grounds). 
 172. During the same fifteen-year time period, only five reported cases with copyrights 
adjudged to be satisfactory sought to vindicate the 1856 performance right for plays. Three 
of the five involved unpublished Dion Boucicault plays. See Boucicault v. Wood, 3 F. Cas. 
988 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1867); Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862); Roberts v. 
Myers, 20 F. Cas. 898, 899 (C.C.D. Mass. 1860). One, the infamous Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 
1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868), involved a copyright in a published play claimed by an American 
playwright. The fifth involved a translation of a French play that appears not to have been 
published in print. The assignees of the copyright produced a copyright certificate and an 
assignment from the copyright proprietor, and neither defendants nor the court appear to 
have raised the issue of invalidity due to the failure of the registrant to publish and deposit 
copies. See Shook v. Rankin, 21 F. Cas. 1337 (C.C.D. Minn. 1875). Evidence from published 
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performance rights where statutory copyrights were defective, but cabined 
them with odd limits. Few cases had arisen, and no general rule had yet 
presented itself.173 Eaton Sylvester Drone, though, was about to publish a 
magisterial treatise that would change that. 
D. EATON DRONE’S NATURAL LAW PLAY RIGHT 
Thirty years after Curtis’s treatise, Eaton Drone published his thicker 
treatise. His goal was more ambitious than Curtis’s: 
The task of the juridical writer is to set forth the true principles 
which govern the law; to point out the proper meaning of the 
statutes; to show what decisions are rights and what are wrong; to 
explain what is doubtful or obscure; and, generally, to give the law 
in a form as true, clear, systematic and harmonious as it is in his 
power to do. He is without authority to say what construction shall 
be given to statutes, and he is without power to overrule erroneous 
decisions. But he may point out the true meaning of the law, and 
show wherein it has been wrongly interpreted. When this has been 
done, the judicial affirmance of what is right and the rejection of 
what is wrong will be in many cases but a question of time.174 
Drone’s view of the scope of copyright law was more capacious than the 
narrow right described by Curtis.175 Drone’s theory was that literary property 
rights were natural rights, and, as such, both perpetual and without 
limitation.176 Such rights could be expressly abrogated by statute, but not by 
courts.177 Beginning with the premise that the author’s natural right to his 
literary property comported with the best theoretical principles and had not 
been effectively disproved by its doubters, he then considered whether 
proponents of any restriction of those common law rights had made an 
effective case for the validity of the limitation.178 Drone rejected as ill-
reasoned cases like Donaldson v. Beckett,179 Wheaton v. Peters,180 and Stowe v. 
 
copyright office records suggests that many playwrights and their assignees continued to 
register the title of their plays without perfecting their copyright with publication and deposit 
of copies. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
 173. See generally MORGAN, supra note 89, at 267–370 (summarizing cases); Herman F. 
Selvin, Should Performance Dedicate?, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 48–50 (1954). 
 174. DRONE, supra note 1, at vii.  
 175. Compare, e.g., id., at 2–26, with CURTIS, supra note 89, at 5–25. 
 176. DRONE, supra note 1, at 8–20, 101–15. 
 177. Id. at 20–26, 116–27. 
 178. See, e.g., id. at 22–26, 47–53; see also R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS LAW AND 
LITERATURE 2 (1886) (“Property right in unpublished works has never been effectively 
questioned – a fact which in itself confirms the view that intellectual property is a natural 
inherent right.”). 
 179. (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837; see DRONE, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
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Thomas.181 Unfortunately, he explained, the British Parliament had abrogated 
playwrights’ common law rights in England by declaring that public 
performance amounted to publication.182 The United States Congress, 
however, had not yet done any such thing, and indeed, the Octoroon case had 
held that performance is not publication.183 Thus, Drone argued, common 
law play right survived in all its glory.184  
Drone’s treatise sought to be comprehensive. It was nearly 800 pages 
long, and cited and discussed most of the copyright cases ever decided. 
Drone, did not, however, rely on judicial reasoning to tell him what the law 
was. Rather, he derived what the law should be from first principles of 
natural law, and then criticized the cases that departed from it.185 That 
allowed him to expound on the proper scope of common law play right, and 
the proper scope according to Drone was exceptionally broad.186  
Here, for example, is Drone on the effect of public performance on 
common law rights: 
The true principle which governs the question relating to the effect 
of public representation on the owner’s exclusive rights in a 
manuscript dramatic composition has been wholly overlooked in 
the recent judicial discussions of the subject. If such rights are lost, 
restricted, or prejudiced by public representation, it must be either 
by force of the common law or by operation of some statute. It has 
been shown elsewhere in this work that by the common law no 
rights in an intellectual production are forfeited by a publication of 
any kind. The property in a literary work is not, by the common 
law, prejudiced even by its publication in print. As far as the 
common law is concerned, the owner’s rights are the same after 
publication in print as they were before. The now settled doctrine 
that there can be no copyright after publication except under the 
 
 180. 33 U.S. 591 (1834); see DRONE, supra note 1, at 43–48. 
 181. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853); see DRONE, supra note 1, at 
450–55. 
 182. DRONE, supra note 1, at 575–76. 
 183. Id. at 555 (citing Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)). 
 184. DRONE, supra note 1, at 573–74. Common law play right cases, Drone cautioned, 
could be brought only in state court unless diversity existed. Id. at 585. 
 185. Thus, Drone spent four pages discussing opinions stating that it was lawful to 
perform a play if one reproduced it entirely from memory, DRONE, supra note 1, at 558–62, 
and seven pages refuting the reasoning underlying the distinction, id. at 566–72. 
 186. E.g., id. at 565–74, 582–84. Contemporary reviews criticized Drone for elevating his 
own theories over judicial decisions. See Culture and Progress: Drone on Copyright, 17 SCRIBNERS 
MONTHLY 911 (Feb. 1879) (“Mr Drone has no slavish reverence for precedents; he reverses 
decisions right and left.”); Mr. Drone’s Treatise on Copyright, 6 INT’L REV. 699, 702 (1879) (“The 
chief difficulty . . . is that he does not, for a lawyer, sufficiently distinguish between his own 
views of what the law ought to be and what the courts have declared it to be.”). 
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statute is based on the ground, not that publication is by the 
common law an abandonment of the author’s rights, but that the 
common law property in a published work is taken away by 
operation of the statute. 
 It is then clear, both on principle and authority, that the 
property in a manuscript play is not injuriously affected by 
authorized public representation, unless by the operation of some 
statute. Now, in the United States, there is no statute which can 
have this effect, because there has been no legislation relating to 
manuscript dramatic compositions. Statutory playright is secured in 
published compositions alone, and representation is not 
publication within the meaning of the statute. When a dramatic 
composition is published in print, the owner’s common-law rights 
are destroyed by operation of the statute, to which he must look 
for protection. But property in a manuscript play is governed 
exclusively by the common law, and is in no wise affected by any 
statute. Hence in the United States, the owner’s rights in a 
manuscript play are not prejudiced by its authorized public 
representation.187 
Armed with Drone’s analysis, the proprietors of scripts filed suit in state 
court (claiming ownership by assignment of playwright’s rights).188 Courts 
followed Drone. Drone originated the name of “playright.” He also invented 
its scope.189 
In Tomkins v. Halleck,190 the Massachusetts Supreme Court reexamined its 
ruling in Keene v. Kimball, and overruled it.191 Orlando Tompkins, one of the 
managers of the Boston Theatre, purchased the exclusive right to present a 
British melodrama in New England from its New York producer, who had 
bought American rights and commissioned a revision to suit American 
audiences.192 During the play’s New York run, two individuals (“one Byron 
 
 187. DRONE, supra note 1, at 574. 
 188. Drone advised that the owner of the common law playright in an unpublished play 
could transfer his or her rights “either in whole or in part . . . by parol.” Id. at 581. 
 189. Thus Drone concluded, on the basis of reasoning not clear to me, that the 
authorized print publication of a manuscript play anywhere in the world would abrogate the 
common law play right of a U.S. rights holder who purchased his exclusive rights prior to 
the publication. See DRONE, supra note 1, at 577–83. When such a case arose, the New York 
State court followed Drone, and held that the common law rights in the manuscript play had 
been destroyed by a subsequent German publication. Daly v. Walrath, 57 N.Y.S. 1125 (App. 
Div. 1899). 
 190. 133 Mass. 32 (1882). 
 191. Id. at 46. 
 192. The World, a melodrama by Paul Merrit, Henry Pettit, and Augustus Harris, received 
an elaborate production that ran from March 21, 1882, for eleven weeks. Orlando Tomkins 
was the senior manager of the Boston Theatre. EUGENE TOMKINS, THE BOSTON THEATRE 
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and one Mora”) attended the play repeatedly. Byron memorized as much as 
he could, and dictated his recollection to Mora.193 Byron sold the resulting 
script to Thomas Halleck, who produced it at his Alhambra Theatre. 
Tompkins filed suit in state court against Halleck, who insisted that 
reproducing a script from memory, as Byron and Mora had done, was 
expressly permitted by Keene v. Kimball. Noting Drone’s objection that the 
privilege to reproduce from memory made no sense, the court repudiated the 
exception.194 
The most Drone-ish common law play right decision is the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Ferris v. Frohman, decided in 1912.195 The case 
concerned a melodrama, The Fatal Card, written by British authors Charles 
Haddon Chambers and BC Stephenson, performed in London in September 
of 1894. The authors registered their British copyright in the play in 
November of 1894 at Stationers Hall. American manager Charles Frohman 
bought the rights of one of the coauthors, and produced it first in New York 
and then as a touring production.196 George MacFarlane adapted the British 
play and sold it to theatre manager Richard Ferris, who registered the 
copyright in the adaptation.197 Ferris’s production of the MacFarlane 
 
1854–1901, at 290 (1908). Thomas Halleck was the proprietor of the Alhambra Theatre, also 
in Boston. DONALD C. KING, THE THEATRES OF BOSTON: A STAGE AND SCREEN HISTORY 
67–68 (2005).  
 193. Tomkins, 133 Mass. at 32. 
 194. Id. at 43–44.  
 195. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (applying pre-1909 Act law). 
 196. See New Bills of the Week, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1894, at 10; The Fatal Card Tonight, 
DAILY KENNEBEC J., Dec. 1, 1895, at 1, col. 4; Theatrical Gossip, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1895, at 
8. Ultimately, Frohman licensed the script to the Famous Players Film Company, who made 
it into a motion picture starring John Mason and Hazel Dawn. See The Fatal Card, THE 
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0005305/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2010). 
 197. There is no indication in any of the reported opinions that Ferris actually published 
the MacFarlane adaptation, so his copyright may have been defective on that ground as well 
as on the ground that it infringed Frohman’s common law rights. See text accompanying 
supra note 146. According to the special master, the MacFarlane adaptation changed the 
original script in many ways, and renamed all of the characters, but retained substantial parts 
of the original plot and dialogue. Ferris v. Frohman, 131 Ill. App. 307, 307 (1907), rev’d, 87 
N.E. 327 (Ill. 1909), aff’d, 223 U.S. 424 (1912). Adapting European scripts for the American 
stage without permission of the original plays’ owners was common throughout the 18th and 
19th centuries, see supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text, and nothing in the American 
copyright statute made it illegal unless the plays had been validly registered in the United 
States (which became possible in 1891, under the Chace Act, see infra note 213 and 
accompanying text). Ferris’s brief to the U.S. Supreme Court made this argument at some 
length. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant in Error at 40–68, Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 
(1912) (No. 44). Frohman’s brief argued that the common law performing right was subject 
to no such exceptions, and that the only issue for decision was whether the public 
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adaptation toured the Midwest to enthusiastic reviews.198 Frohman filed suit 
in Illinois state court to enjoin Ferris’s production on the basis of his 
common law play right. The trial court referred the case to a special master, 
who recommended a verdict for the defendant.199 The trial court instead 
found for Frohman, entered an injunction and ordered an accounting of 
profits.200  
Ferris appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.201 The appellate court 
reasoned that since British law treated public performance as equivalent to 
publication, the public performance of the play in London had terminated 
the authors’ common law rights, and left them with only their statutory 
copyright. The authors, therefore, had no common law rights to sell to 
Frohman.202  
Frohman appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed.203 The court 
held, relying on Drone, that at common law, an author had “an absolute 
property right in his production which he could not be deprived of so long as 
it remained unpublished, nor could he be compelled to publish it.”204 
Statutory copyright, however, remained unavailable to works that had not 
been printed and published. Since there was no provision for securing 
copyright for unpublished plays, common law protection remained available 
and was not waived by public performance.205 Ferris appealed to the U.S. 
 
performance of the play in England forfeited its common law copyright protection 
worldwide. Brief of Respondant-Appellee in Error at 13–37, Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 
424 (1912) (No. 44). 
 198. See, e.g., Another Big Hit: The “Fatal Card” Proves the Strongest Play Yet Seen at Low Prices, 
CEDAR RAPIDS REPUBLICAN, Aug. 30, 1900, at 1, col. 3. 
 199. See Ferris, 131 Ill. App. at 308–09. 
 200. See Ferris, 223 U.S. at 430. 
 201. Ferris, 131 Ill. App. at 314. 
 202. Id. at 312–14: 
When the authors published the play at the Adelphi Theatre, London, it 
was with their consent, as the record shows, That act was done and 
assented to under the law there in force, which expressly provided that it 
should be the legal equivalent “to the first publication of any book.” 
. . . . 
It follows, we think, that the English authors of this play had no property 
rights in the United States, which they could confer upon the appellee, 
Frohman . . . at any time subsequent to the publication in London. We 
are, therefore, of the opinion that appellees, complainants below, failed to 
establish an exclusive right to produce the play in the United States . . . . 
 203. Ferris, 87 N.E. at 332. 
 204. Id. at 328 (citing DRONE, supra note 1, at 101 et. seq.). 
 205. Id. (citing DRONE, supra note 1, at 119). The 1909 Act made it possible for the first 
time to register copyright in an unpublished play. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. 
The facts of the Frohman case preceded the enactment of the 1909 Act, even though the 
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Supreme Court, which, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Hughes, 
affirmed.206 
The basis for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was not straightforward. 
The Illinois Supreme Court had decided the case entirely as a matter of 
Illinois state common law, and Frohman objected that the appeal raised no 
federal question.207 Justice Hughes held, however, that the fact that Ferris had 
registered a copyright in MacFarlane’s adaptation provided a federal basis for 
appellate jurisdiction, because the decision denied Ferris a right otherwise 
secured by federal copyright law.208 Beginning with the observation that “[i]t 
is not open to dispute that the authors of ‘The Fatal Card’ had a common 
law right of property until it was publicly performed,” the Court held that 
neither the English performance nor the English statute had forfeited that 
right. “The public representation of a dramatic composition, not printed and 
published, does not deprive the owner of his common law right, save by 
operation of statute. At common law, the public performance of the play is 
not an abandonment of it to the public use.”209 
The British statutes, the Court continued, did not affect common law 
rights in the United States, so the authors were free to convey it to 
Frohman.210 That being the case, MacFarlane’s adaptation “was simply a 
piratical composition,” and not entitled to federal copyright protection.211 
As Drone had, the Court began with the premise that authors had 
unqualified common law rights and asked whether something had happened 
to take those rights away.212 Finding that no statute had done so, the Court 
skipped right past the question of the appropriate scope of the common law 
right to the determination that defendants had necessarily invaded it.  
Common law play right was a kluge. Courts had invented it to fill gaps in 
statutory protection, which applied only to printed, published works by 
United States citizens or residents. Drone expanded it because it represented 
a nearly blank canvas on which to paint his theories of the appropriate scope 
 
Supreme Court’s eventual decision was handed down three years later. Nothing in the 
language of Justice Hughes’ opinion, however, suggests that the unavailability of statutory 
copyright for unpublished works before 1909 figured in the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning. 
 206. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912). 
 207. Id. at 430–31. 
 208. Id. at 431. 
 209. Id. at 434–35. 
 210. Id. at 436–37. 
 211. Id. at 437. None of the published opinions in the case addressed the similarities 
between the original script and the MacFarland adaptation, so it is difficult to know whether 
Ferris’s “piratical composition” was more similar to Frohman’s than the successful Daly and 
Boucicault adaptations had been similar to their European antecedents. 
 212.  Id. at 434–37. 
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of natural-law based common law literary property. Courts followed Drone 
both because his treatise seemed comprehensive and because they were 
drawn, during the period, to the concept of a theoretically coherent body of 
natural law that expressed itself in the particulars of common law. Congress, 
however, had already begun to address the gaps that had made common law 
play right seem necessary.  
In 1891, after heavy and long lobbying by playwrights, Congress passed 
the Chace international copyright bill, extending copyright to foreign 
nationals so long as they complied with statutory procedures still including 
registration, publication with notice, and deposit of copies.213 In 1897, 
Congress passed a law imposing criminal penalties for unauthorized public 
performance of dramatic or musical compositions.214 In 1909, in connection 
with the general revision of copyright, Congress finally enacted a provision 
enabling the author or proprietor of a dramatic composition not reproduced 
for sale to secure federal copyright protection through registration and 
deposit.215 Thus, the United States had finally added to its law the sort of 
provisions that playwrights argued were necessary to protect their work. For 
dramatists who preferred it, moreover, there was the potentially boundless 
and perpetual protection of common law play right a la Eaton Drone.216 
E. WHOSE PLAY RIGHT? 
The reader who has been paying attention will have noticed that very few 
of the complainants in the cases thus discussed were actual playwrights.217 
Both common law and statutory claims were pressed on behalf of 
proprietors who bought all rights from authors, typically for a flat fee. Except 
for playwrights who managed their own theatre companies, neither American 
nor European dramatists controlled the American rights to their plays.218 By 
 
 213. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 214. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481. 
 215. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 11, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078. The 1909 Act also expressly 
preserved the right of an “author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or 
in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his 
consent.” Id. § 2. 
 216. See, e.g., O’Neill v. Gen. Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028 (App. Div. 1916). 
 217. Two of the more litigious claimants, Augustin Daly and Dionysus Bouciault, were 
in fact playwrights some of the time, but they were also theatre managers. And Daly, 
although apparently terrifically prolific, appears not to have written many of the plays that he 
claimed. See generally MARVIN FELHEIM, THE THEATER OF AUGUSTIN DALY: AN ACCOUNT 
OF THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN STAGE 122–40, 144, 220–22 (1956) 
(identifying some of Daly’s unattributed collaborators). 
 218. See, e.g., WALSH, supra note 129, at 32–34 and sources there cited. 
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the early 20th century, the law may have become playwright-friendly, but 
customary theatre practice had not. 
By the end of the 19th century, theatre managers had discovered that 
rather than maintaining a stock company to present a season of plays in 
repertory at a single theatre, it was more profitable to open a show in New 
York City with a bankable star, run it until audience attention flagged, and 
then tour it to cities throughout the country.219 The principal actors and the 
scenery would need to be transported from city to city, but the managers of 
local houses could provide extra actors and crew.220 Under this model, the 
economics of an efficient touring route became more important than the 
script, which was often merely a vehicle for the bankable star of the day. 
Theatrical producers focused on leasing or purchasing theatres in cities to 
facilitate lucrative tours. Charles Frohman allied himself with producers Abe 
Erlanger, Marc Klaw, Al Hayman, Samuel Nixon, and Fred Zimmerman to 
pool their theatres into a national chain and book tours through a central 
office.221 Within a short time, the syndicate had an effective monopoly over 
American play houses, and began to demand concessions from actors, 
copyright owners, rival managers, and booking agents.222 Unhappy managers 
formed a splinter association of producers headed by the Shubert brothers to 
do battle with the trust.223 Both groups competed by acquiring and building 
new playhouses, investing in vaudeville and novelty attractions, and seeking 
the allegiance of each others’ members.224 By the time of the first World War, 
there were a glut of theatres, and too few attractions to fill them.225  
Empty playhouses and demand for more economical entertainment 
helped motion pictures eclipse live theatre more quickly than anyone would 
have believed possible.226 Movies had two huge advantages over stage 
 
 219. See BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 28–31; OWEN DAVIS, MY FIRST FIFTY YEARS IN 
THE THEATRE 27–41 (1950); HENNEKE, supra note 129, at 84–96, 175–92; JERRY STAGG, 
THE BROTHERS SHUBERT 14–16 (1968). 
 220. See BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 28–29, 34–37. 
 221. See id. at 40–50; WALSH, supra note 129, at 19–31. 
 222. See BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 44–63; GLENN HUGHES, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN THEATRE 1700–1950, at 317–18 (1951); GEORGE MIDDLETON, THESE THINGS 
ARE MINE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A JOURNEYMAN PLAYWRIGHT 53–55 (1947); STAGG, 
supra note 219, at 16–17, 29–51; Sean P. Holmes, All The World’s a Stage! The Actors’ Strike of 
1919, 91 J. OF AM. HIST. 1291, 1292–95 (2005); Steve Travis, The Rise and Fall of the Theatrical 
Syndicate, 10 EDUC. THEATRE J. 35 (1958). 
 223. See BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 64–67. 
 224. See id. at 67–74. 
 225. See id. at 75–84. 
 226. See id. at 85–92; HUGHES, supra note 222, at 319; MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 
374–76. 
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productions: they appealed to broader audiences and their tickets were much 
cheaper.227 By the 1920s, the motion picture industry had triumphed, and, at 
least outside of New York City, theatre was already in decline.228 
The war between the syndicate and the independent producers, 
meanwhile, had not been kind to working conditions for actors or 
playwrights.229 The commercial producers’ focus on theatre buildings and 
famous stars had led to steady erosion in the perceived importance of 
ordinary actors and dramatists, and their bargaining power as individuals was 
modest.230 In 1919, New York City actors formed a union, and, in August 
they went on strike, paralyzing Broadway theaters for a month.231 When 
performances resumed, the Actors Equity Association had managed to 
negotiate a minimum contract for its members. In response, playwrights 
formed a labor union of their own, and started talking about persuading 
producers to accept a minimum dramatists’ contract.232 They compared the 
different contracts that they had signed, and found wide variation. Some 
playwrights wrote scripts as works made for hire, or were required to invest 
their own money in productions of their plays.233 The Charles Frohman 
Company insisted on the playwright’s ceding at least half of the stock 
performance and motion picture rights and performance rights in any 
music.234 Many producers felt no compunction about rewriting lines or 
miscasting roles. Yet efforts to persuade playwrights to band together to 
insist on better pay or more artistic control had so far failed.235 
What brought matters to a head was the question of what we now refer 
to as subsidiary rights. Producers insisted on controlling licensing of the plays 
they purchased and sharing any earnings after its initial production.236 They 
 
 227. BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 88. 
 228. See id. at 85–92; BARNARD HEWITT, THEATRE U.S.A. 383 (1959); MIDDLETON, 
supra note 222, at 376–77. 
 229. See MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 45, 53, 60, 68–70, 138–39 (describing problems 
for playwrights); WALSH, supra note 129, at 32–34 (describing problems for playwrights); 
Holmes, supra note 222, at 1293–95 (describing poor working conditions for actors). 
 230. See BERNHEIM, supra note 123, at 67–79. Both the Syndicate and the Shubert allies 
had invested heavily in vaudeville to fill their theatres, see id. at 67–69, further diminishing 
the importance of dramatic actors and scripts.  
 231. See HUGHES, supra note 222, at 377; Holmes, supra note 222, at 1299–1315. 
 232. See Thomas James Walsh, Playwrights and Power: The Dramatists’ Guild Struggle for the 
1926 Minimum Basic Agreement, in ART, GLITTER AND GLITZ: MAINSTREAM PLAYWRIGHTS 
AND POPULAR THEATRE IN 1920S AMERICA 107, 108–113 (Arthur Gewirtz & James J. Kolb 
eds., 2004). 
 233. See id.; MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 311–13. 
 234. See Walsh, supra note 232 at 108–09. 
 235. See MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 304–09. 
 236. See Walsh, supra note 232, at 107–09. 
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were particularly eager to sell their scripts to the new movie industry. The 
Fox Film Corporation approached several major producers, offering to pay 
the producers a salary in return for giving Fox both a say in the plays they 
produced and an option to purchase the movie rights.237 Playwrights argued 
that if they did not gain control of their copyrights, the only plays any theater 
would be willing to produce would be the plays that seemed suitable for 
film.238 They devised a minimum basic agreement under which the dramatist 
would keep the copyright to the play and creative control of the production; 
the producer would agree to pay a royalty in the form of a percentage of the 
gross box office receipts from the production; and the author would receive 
not less than half of the proceeds from a motion picture sale. The dramatists 
agreed with one another that they would refuse to give permission to stage 
any of their scripts to a producer who did not agree that henceforth, he 
would use the minimum contract for all American dramatists and all New 
York productions.239 Producers objected to the playwrights’ insistence on 
copyright ownership and creative control.240 After a significant amount of 
blustering, and some preliminary skirmishing in court,241 though, the 
producers agreed.242 
Why did the producers go along? Both the idea that theatrical 
entertainment was exempt from the antitrust laws and the claim that the 
Dramatists Guild should be treated as a labor union were more colorable in 
the 1920s than they are today.243 The majority of established playwrights 
insisted they would refuse to sign any production contract with a manager 
 
 237. See id. at 108–10. 
 238. See MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 308. Other developments had exacerbated the 
problem. In 1910, Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1910), had held that the 
initial assignee of a copyright was the sole copyright owner, and that an author could not, 
consistently with the statute, assign some exclusive rights but retain others. Under this ruling, 
copyrights were not divisible and the first producer of a play claimed not only the public 
performance rights, but the book publishing and motion picture rights as well. See Copyrights: 
Hearings on H.R. 11258 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 45, 48 (1925) (statement of 
Ellis Parker Butler, Authors’ League of America). 
 239. See MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 298–331. 
 240. See WALSH, supra note 129, at 114–19. 
 241. See Shuberts Seek Stay on Authors’ Guild: Producers to Carry Fight on “Tyrannical” Practices 
to Supreme Court Monday, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1927, at 15; Shuberts Start War on Dramatists: 
Ask Injunction Against Guild Charging Secondary Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1927, at 9. 
 242. See MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 322–32; STAGG, supra note 219, at 250. 
 243. See Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 12 F.2d 341, 344 (2d Cir. 1926) 
(dismissing antitrust suit against agent for vaudeville performers because “the business of 
acting in a theater is purely a state affair”); People v. Klaw, 106 N.Y.S. 341, 354 (Crim. Ct. 
1907) (dismissing antitrust indictment because “I have failed to find any decision, nor has my 
attention been directed to any decision, classifying theatrical amusements as articles of ‘trade’ 
and ‘commerce.’ ”)  
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who had not agreed to be bound by the Guild’s minimum basic agreement 
(“MBA”).244 The actors’ strike had demonstrated that collective action could 
close theatres. The new infusion of money from movie studios was 
significant, playwrights would be necessary parties to the sale of new scripts 
to the film companies, and producers may have believed them when they 
threatened to withhold their work. Perhaps, even then, it was clear that the 
money involved in movies would eventually dwarf the money to be made 
from live theatre, and devising a way to share the proceeds from the sale of 
film rights seemed important enough to make compromises on issues of 
creative control and copyright ownership worthwhile. Or, it may be that 
playwright/producer relations were always friendlier and less antagonistic 
than actor/producer relations. A playwright could, after all, take the next play 
elsewhere.245 In any event, by the fall of 1927, all major commercial 
producers had agreed with the dramatists’ terms.  
Ironically, the 1926–27 season represented the historical peak for new 
play production on Broadway, with 188 new plays.246 Broadway productions 
of new plays have declined steadily since; in 2007–08, only seven new plays 
opened on Broadway.247 
The MBA was renegotiated in 1931, 1936, 1941, 1946, 1955, 1961, and 
1985,248 but the essential terms remained the same. Playwrights keep 
ownership of their copyrights and creative control of stage productions of 
their scripts.249 Producers pay playwrights a minimum percentage of box 
office receipts.250 Producers and playwrights share subsequent earnings and 
 
 244. William Klein II, Authors and Creators: Up By Their Own Bootstraps, 14 COMM. & L. 41, 
61–62 (1992). 
 245. The fledgling Guild was careful to recruit the most lucrative playwrights from each 
producer’s stable. See MIDDLETON, supra note 222, at 316. 
 246. TODD LONDON, BEN PESNER & ZANNIE GIRAUD VOSS, OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE: 
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE NEW AMERICAN PLAY 23–34 (2009). 
 247. Id. at 24. 
 248. See WALSH, supra note 129, at 134–38 (comparing 1931 and 1936 contracts with 
1926 contract); id. at 160–63 (explaining 1955 contracts); Alvin Deutsch, MBPC: Resquesciat in 
Pace – APC: Quo Vadis, 3 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3 (Spring 1985) (comparing 1985 APC with 
1961 MBPC); Klein, supra note 244, at 41, 61–62 (1992) (comparing 1954 MBA with earlier 
contracts); Michael G. Yamin, Legal Problems in Broadway Theatrical Productions, 21 BUS. L. 453 
(1966) (explaining 1961 MBPC). The Guild has more recently also promulgated contracts for 
smaller, nonprofit, and regional theatres. See WALSH, supra note 129, at 190–209; Klein, supra 
note 244, at 64–65; Mervyn Rothstein, Dramatists Guild Writes a Contract for its Members, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, at C19.  
 249. See, e.g., Approved Production Contract for Plays §§ 1.06, 8.01, reprinted in FARBER, 
supra note 8, at 177, 179, 201–02.  
 250. See id. §§ 4.01–4.04, at 184–91. 
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split the receipts from sales of film rights.251 There has been controversy, and 
litigation. Producers filed antitrust suits claiming that the Dramatists Guild 
violates the antitrust laws.252 In 1945, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit agreed,253 but ended up dismissing the case on the ground that the 
plaintiff had shown no damage.254 In 1982, producers sued again on similar 
claims.255 The Guild filed a counterclaim asserting that the producers had 
themselves violated the antitrust laws by conspiring to fix playwright 
compensation at an artificially low level.256 The litigation settled before 
anything too final could happen.257 When a new round of contract 
 
 251. See id. §§ 11.01–11.08, at 216–26. 
 252. See, e.g., Drama Guild Sued to End ‘Monopoly,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1941, at 23. 
 253. Ring v. Spina, 148 F. 2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) (preliminary injunction); see also Ring v. 
Author’s League of Am., 186 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1951) (appeal after jury verdict). 
 254. Author’s League of Am., 186 F.2d 637. After the Second Circuit ruled that plaintiff 
independent producer had made a prima facie showing of an antitrust violation and ordered 
the trial court to enter a preliminary injunction, Spina, 148 F.2d at 651–54, the trial court 
submitted the question whether the Guild was a labor union (and thus entitled to the labor 
antitrust exemption) to the jury, which concluded that it was not, and that the Guild had 
violated the antitrust laws. Author’s League, 186 F.2d at 639. Both Ring and the Authors’ 
League appealed. In an apparent attempt to limit the damage of ruling the Guild to be illegal, 
Judge Learned Hand declined to revisit the antitrust issue: 
[T]he League is naturally concerned that it shall not be held to be a 
conspiracy in violation of the Anti-Trust Acts. It vigorously protests its 
innocence and its beneficence; it is conscious of no wrongdoing, and 
asserts that its existence is essential to the protection of authors and 
composers. Such purposes would of course not protect it, if it is in fact a 
combination in restraint of trade or an attempted monopoly; but they are 
relevant in deciding whether we should decide issues in which the plaintiff 
has only the most shadowy interests. We hold therefore that the judgment 
should not have decided that, if the authors revive the play they must give 
the plaintiff an opportunity to “produce” it on an equal footing with 
anyone else, and that it should have contained no injunction. However, 
we hasten to add that we leave open all legal questions which such issues 
involve; we wish to make it entirely clear that we are not be be understood 
either to throw any doubt upon, or to affirm, what we said when we 
granted the temporary injunction; we merely decide that the necessity for 
such affirmance does not arise. 
Id. at 643. 
 255. Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see Carol Lawson, 
Dramatists Guild Sued Over Royalty Payments, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1982, at C19, col. 1. 
 256. Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 558–59. 
 257. Leslie Bennett, Writers and Producers Reach Contract Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
1985, at C21; see WALSH, supra note 129, at 176–89 (describing negotiations that resulted in 
the settlement of the litigation). The Guild and League of American Theatres and Producers 
agreed to characterize the 1985 Approved Production Contracts as recommended rather 
than mandatory, but the Guild continues its policy of disciplining members who sign a 
contract that does not substantially comply with the Guild’s approved minimum terms. 
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negotiations raised the specter of a new antitrust suit in 2002, famous 
playwrights persuaded Senators Hatch and Schumer to introduce the 
Playwrights Licensing Relief Act.258 The bill would have exempted 
playwrights from antitrust liability for participating in discussions or 
negotiations to facilitate a standard form contract with producers.259 Senators 
Hatch and Kennedy and Representative Coble reintroduced the bill in the 
following Congress, where it received a hearing, but no further action.260  
The enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act has, in theory, completely 
obliterated any copyright distinction between published and unpublished 
plays. To the extent a common law performance right existed at some time 
under the 1870 or 1909 Acts, the 1976 Act makes the right a thing of the 
past. The elimination of publication or registration as a condition of statutory 
copyright also enabled other creative contributors to claim copyright in their 
 
Members who are expelled from the Guild or who resign to avoid being expelled from the 
Guild may rejoin after a year. 
 258. S. 2082, 107th Cong. (2002); see Jesse McKinley, Legislation to Help Playwrights 
Negotiate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at E6, col. 1. 
 259. Section 2 of the Bill would have provided: 
(a) IN GENERAL- Subject to subsection (c), the antitrust laws shall not 
apply to any joint discussion, consideration, review, action, or agreement 
for the express purpose of, and limited to, the development of a standard 
form contract containing minimum terms of artistic protection and levels 
of compensation for playwrights by means of— 
(1) meetings, discussions, and negotiations between or among playwrights 
or their representatives and producers or their representatives; or 
(2) joint or collective voluntary actions for the limited purposes of 
developing a standard form contract by playwrights or their 
representatives. 
(b) ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION- Subject to subsection (c), 
the antitrust laws shall not apply to any joint discussion, consideration, 
review, or action for the express purpose of, and limited to, reaching a 
collective agreement among playwrights adopting a standard form 
contract developed pursuant to subsection (a) as the participating 
playwrights sole and exclusive means by which participating playwrights 
shall license their plays to producers. 
(c) AMENDMENT OF CONTRACT- A standard form of contract 
developed and implemented under subsections (a) and (b) shall be subject 
to amendment by individual playwrights and producers consistent with 
the terms of the standard form contract. 
S. 2082, § 2. 
 260. See generally The Playwrights Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act: Safeguarding the Future of 
American Live Theater: Hearing on S. 2349 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Cong. (2004). 
Representative Coble reintroduced the Bill in the 109th Congress. See H.R. 532, 109th Cong. 
(2005). It died there. 
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authorship as part of any production that is fixed in tangible form.261 
Directors and other collaborators have asserted copyright ownership of their 
contributions,262 to be met with protests from the Guild.263 The Dramatists 
Guild insists that recognizing any other contributor as an author would mean 
the death of drama as we know it.264 Although some of these disputes led to 
litigation, most of the lawsuits have also settled.265 
 
 261. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103 (2006). Some commentators have argued that a 
derivative author owns no copyright in a licensed derivative work unless the owner of the 
copyright in the underlying work has authorized it. See, e.g., William Patry, Copyright in Stage 
Directions?, PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG, (Jan. 29, 2006, 8:42 AM), 
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/01/copyright-in-stage-directions.html (“If, as 
Einhorn apparently represented to the Copyright Office, his work is a derivative work of the 
play script, under Section 103, he is unlikely to be able to have a valid copyright without the 
playwright's permission, which presumably here would be denied.”). This is careless reading. 
So long as the derivative work is created lawfully, sections 102 and 103 provide for 
automatic copyright protection, regardless of the copyright owner’s permission. See also H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-1476, at 58 (1976) (“Under this provision, copyright could be obtained as long 
as the use of the preexisting work was not ‘unlawful,’ even though the consent of the 
copyright owner had not been obtained.”). Were this not the case, there would be no need to 
provide expressly in section 115(a)(2) that when a sound recording is made pursuant to a 
statutory compulsory license (as distinguished from a negotiated license or a Harry Fox 
license), the new musical arrangement authorized by the statute will not be protected by 
copyright unless the owner of the copyright in the underlying musical composition consents. 
 262. Jesse Green, Exit, Pursued by A Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Section 2: Arts 
& Leisure 1, col. 5; see, e.g., Mullen v. Soc’y of Dirs. & Choreographers, No. 06 C 6818, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75235 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007) (suit over copyright in direction, 
choreography and scenic design of Urinetown); Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 
2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (suit over copyright in Edward Einhorn’s direction of Tam Lin); 
Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (suit over copyright in Joe Mantello’s 
direction of Love!Valour!Compassion!). 
 263. See Dramatists Guild of Am., Statement: Dramatist Copyright and Intellectual Property 
Rights, http://dramatistsguild.com/about_statements_copyright.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 
2010): 
The Council of the Guild has become aware that directors, dramaturgs 
and other theatrical collaborators have from time to time claimed 
copyright and other ownership interests in any such changes or 
contributions for which they claim to be responsible. They have 
attempted to establish their claims, among other means, by videotaping 
performances or filing with the Copyright Office the dramatist's script 
with changes, notations and other additions claimed by these 
collaborators. Such claims and actions infringe on the rights of dramatists 
to own and control their plays, and may inhibit the opportunities of other 
professionals, and audiences, to participate in the re-creation and 
enjoyment of the play. 
Id. 
 264. E.g., Weidman, supra note 10. The Guild argues that its members’ contracts require 
the playwright’s approval of any changes to the script, and oblige the producer to assign 
ownership of any changes to the playwright. Since the production is licensed subject to that 
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Today, playwrights in America retain both copyright ownership and 
creative control in their plays. Those strong copyright rights have not, 
however, made playwriting remunerative. A 2009 study by the Theatre 
Development Fund concluded that it is no longer possible for even the most 
successful playwrights to earn a living from productions of their plays.266 
Working playwrights need to supplement their incomes with teaching or with 
writing scripts for film or television under work made for hire contracts. 
Meanwhile, the Drone-ish form of common law copyright has entirely 
died out, forgotten by everyone but the record labels who claim it for their 
pre-1972 recordings.267 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What lessons can we draw from the history of common law play right in 
America? Several lessons seem evident. Most obviously, for all of the author-
centric rhetoric pervading the cases and secondary literature, common law 
play right was never a playwright’s right—it was asserted almost exclusively 
by and on behalf of the theatre managers and publishers who claimed to be 
the playwright’s assigns. We can miss important information when we take 
author’s rights language at face value, without asking ourselves who is 
speaking the language and what, exactly, he or she seeks to accomplish.  
Second, for legal scholars, a particularly interesting subplot in this story 
represents what Ann Bartow has termed “the Hegemony of the Copyright 
Treatise.”268 Eaton Drone was able to write a thick, comprehensive treatise 
 
clause, the producer has no right to enter into contracts with directors or designers that 
permit them to retain copyright in their contributions. The Stage Directors and 
Choreographers Society, which represents directors, has negotiated collective bargaining 
agreements with Broadway, Off-Broadway, regional, and stock theatres under which both 
directors and choreographers retain copyright in their contributions. See Stage Dirs. & 
Choreographers Soc’y, SDC Contracts: Collectively Bargained Agreements, 
http://sdcweb.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=96 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 265. See, e.g., Andrew Gans, Akron Urinetwon Lawsuit Settled, PLAYBILL.COM, July 2, 2008, 
http://www.playbill.com/news/article/119148-Akron-Urinetown-Lawsuit-Settled; 
Campbell Robertson, A Urinetown Suit is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at B8; Lisa Jo 
Sagolla, Dance/Movement: Should Stage Direction Be Copyrightable?, BACKSTAGE, May 20, 2008, 
http://www.backstage.com/bso/esearch/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003805591.  
 266. LONDON, PESNER & VOSS, supra note 246, at 47–96. 
 267. See Capitol Records v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004) (certifying 
common law copyright question to N.Y. Court of Appeals); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos 
of Am., Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 540 (2005) (holding that N.Y. common law copyright protects sound 
recordings made before 1972 even if they are in the public domain in their country of 
origin). 
 268. Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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because, instead of deriving legal principles from statutes and judicial 
decisions, he created his legal principles out of whole cloth and discussed 
judicial decisions to demonstrate where they were consistent and inconsistent 
with the principles he announced. That allowed Drone to have answers for 
many questions courts had not addressed, and to pick the winners when 
court decisions demonstrated a conflict of authority. Drone didn’t hide his 
method, or pretend that he was merely describing the law, rather than 
seeking to reshape it. Courts and other writers nonetheless relied on Drone 
as a dependable account of what the law was, rather than an argument about 
what Drone believed the law ought to become.269  
Third, the fact that common law performance rights in both England and 
America did not precede statutory performance rights but followed them, 
growing up in response to perceived gaps in the rights under the statute, 
parallels the history of common law printing rights. This history should 
probably count as another nail in the coffin of the story of copyright’s 
natural right origins in the days of primordial ooze. Further, the histories of 
the two different flavors of common law copyright suggest that what rights 
that we perceive as inherent or natural are fundamentally contingent on what 
rights already have names and a path to enforcement.  
Finally, the story reminds us that, for most people, the customs that grow 
up around what people believe the law to be matter more than what the law 
really is. Dramatists were able to get exceptional authors’ rights through 
collective action that was not tied to any statute or judicial decision, and they 
have retained those rights despite (and maybe even in defiance of) later 
statutes or judicial decisions. Of the 20,000 dramatists who registered the title 
of their plays without depositing copies and thought they had thereby 
perfected a federal copyright, most of them got an apparent copyright that 
 
 269. The most disturbing example, in my view, is probably William S. Strauss’s uncritical 
parroting of Drone in the 1957 copyright office study on protection for unpublished works. 
See Strauss, supra note 19. Because the series of studies was in general so meticulous, scholars 
who came after believed Strauss’s description was apt. Strauss may have had a reform 
agenda. In a law review article published at around the same time, he argued that U.S. 
common law in general, and common law copyright in particular, provided protection of 
authors’ rights that was substantially equivalent with the droit morale required under article 
6bis of the Berne Convention. See William S. Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 506, 538 (1955). That article, with some additions, became the Copyright Office’s 
1959 study on moral rights. See WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, STUDY NO. 4: THE MORAL RIGHT OF 
THE AUTHOR, reprinted in S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW 
REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (Comm. Print 1960); LIBRARY OF 
CONG., SIXTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL 
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1957, at 9–10 (1957). 
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probably worked as well for them as the real thing would have. Today, the 
strong attribution and integrity rights that playwrights claim, and their 
insistence on denying that their collaborators author contributions, have 
everything to do with customs and contracts, and very little to do to with 
copyright law. 
